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SUPREME SILENCE AND PRECEDENTIAL
PRAGMATISM:
KING V. BURWELL AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS
MICHAEL J. CEDRONE*
This Article studies statutory interpretation as it is practiced in the federal
courts of appeal. Much of the academic commentary in this field focuses on the
Supreme Court, which skews the debate and unduly polarizes the field. This
Article investigates more broadly by looking at the seventy-two federal
appellate cases that cite King v. Burwell in the two years after the Court issued
its decision. In deciding that the words “established by the State” encompass
a federal program, the Court in King reached a pragmatic and practical result
based on statutory scheme and purpose at a fairly high level of generality.
Cases that cite King might be expected to accept or reject this kind of purpose
move, and to generally be more attentive to matters of interpretation.
The results presented here reveal a dynamic landscape in which federal
appeals courts seem relatively uncommitted to ideological battles over
interpretive principles, notwithstanding the relatively small number of opinions
that contain rhetorical flourishes in this area. Courts freely pursue the best
reading of statutory text through textual and purposive means: linguistic
analysis of the words, contextual readings of multiple statutory provisions and
analysis of the statutory scheme, and evidence of purpose gleaned from textual
and extra-textual sources. While not pervasive, legislative history commonly
guides interpretation. These results hold across cases where text and purpose
conflict and where text and purpose are in harmony. In cases of conflict, the
results also hold across cases that reach results primarily based on text and
* Michael J. Cedrone is Professor of Law, Legal Practice at Georgetown University Law Center.
I am most grateful to many people who have engaged with me regarding the ideas in this article, most
especially my colleagues in the Georgetown Legal Writing program. Professor Jeffrey Shulman read
the article and engaged deeply with it; I am grateful for his constant support. Professors Sonya
Bonneau, Erin Carroll, Fran DeLaurentis, Diana Donahoe, Susan McMahon, Jonah Perlin, Jarrod
Reich, Julie Ross, Rima Sirota, Kris Tiscione, and Jessica Wherry each made important contributions
at various times.
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cases that reach results based primarily on purpose. Further, given the
opportunity to weigh in on lower court statutory construction debates, the
Supreme Court has remained silent. This Article concludes that it is
normatively desirable that lower federal courts have not embraced the statutory
construction battles in an all-encompassing way. The Article concludes with
the caveat that this research should be revisited to assess the effect of Donald
Trump’s appointments to the judiciary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Statutory interpretation has been an intractable focus of contention for a
very long time because the debate about the proper result in any particular case
can be a proxy for underlying assumptions about ways of reading language and
the proper role of the courts in the United States legal system.1 The stakes are
high: statutory issues pervade the federal courts: nearly two-thirds of the
Supreme Court’s recent docket focuses on the meanings of federal statutes, and
statutory issues abound in the lower federal courts as well.2 While statutory
interpretation is often simplified into a text-vs.-purpose zero-sum tug-of-war,
this view posits a false dichotomy: the actual landscape is considerably more
complex and nuanced.
Textualists have been ascendant at the Supreme Court for decades and that
their influence has been felt throughout the federal judiciary and academia.3
However, few judicial or academic interpreters are textual exclusivists.4 Most
judges and theorists agree that purpose is a relevant consideration, though they
differ about how much to consider the purpose when purpose and text are in
tension—and even when they are not.5 Further, they also disagree about what
evidence of statutory purpose is legitimate.6 Some look for purpose primarily
in the text and structure of the statute as a whole, while others would admit
legislative history as evidence of legislative purpose.7 These debates over the
proper role of purpose and the legitimate evidence of purpose are where much
of the real debate lies.
1. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 5 (2012) (arguing that the notion that judges invented the common law over time has
“stretched into a belief that judges ‘make’ law through judicial interpretation of democratically enacted
statutes”), with ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 10 (2014) (arguing that courts should
“[r]espect[] Congress’s work product” so that “courts will interpret the law in a manner consistent with
legislative purposes” and “Congress will perceive the courts as productive partners rather than as
meddlers substituting their own preferences for that of the legislative branch”).
2. KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 3, 122 n.1.
3. See generally Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118
(2016) (describing a textualist method of statutory interpretation).
4. See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 115.
5. See id.; Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006).
6. See Molot, supra note 5, at 2.
7. See id.
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Both of these dilemmas were presented to the Supreme Court in King v.
Burwell,8 which presents the strongest purposive result reached by the Court in
decades. In King, the Court held that the words “established by the State,” used
in the Affordable Care Act,9 encompassed a program established by the federal
government.10 Reaching this holding required the Court to sidestep the textual
meaning of “established by the State.”11 Instead, the Court relied on the
structure of the Act as a whole and on legislative purpose at a fairly broad level
of generality.12 As Chief Justice John Roberts declared in his opinion for a 6-3
majority, “Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health
insurance markets, not to destroy them.”13 Notably, the Court did not
meaningfully rely on legislative history in reaching this conclusion.14
The result in King is unusual for a Court with a majority of textualists;
indeed, it has been termed “one of the most interesting statutory interpretation
cases in recent years” by now-Justice Brett Kavanaugh.15 The case seems a
vivid demonstration that purpose is not dead, nor is it on life support, and that
purpose still has outcome-determinative effect in at least some difficult and
consequential cases where the language of particular provisions seems at odds
with the statutory purpose and scheme.
Academic discussion of statutory interpretation has tended to focus on the
Supreme Court to the exclusion of other tribunals.16 This state of affairs leads
the academy to focus overly on the statements and commitments of Members
of the Court and not to focus on the business of judging as it is practiced in
courts with substantial impact on the lives of many Americans.17 There is some
8. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
9. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001−121 (2010).
10. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2494–95. The federal exchange is established under the statute for states
that elect not to set up and manage their own exchanges. Id. at 2494.
11. Id. at 2495.
12. Id. at 2494–95.
13. Id. at 2496.
14. See id. at 2492–96.
15. Kavanaugh, supra note 3, at 2158–59. Then-future-Justice Kavanaugh said it was “not [his]
place to say whether King v. Burwell was right or wrong in its outcome,” but he said that the question
would depend on whether courts could “look at the overall Act and adopt what they [i.e. courts]
conclude Congress meant rather than what Congress said.” Id.
16. See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of
Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1300 (2018) (“[T]he
Supreme Court’s practice has received nearly all of the attention from academics and practitioners.”).
17. See id. at 1300−01.
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indication that this situation is beginning to change. Prof. Abbe Gluck has
studied state court statutory interpretation,18 and she and Judge Richard Posner
recently surveyed the statutory interpretation views of judges on the federal
courts of appeal.19
This Article furthers the study of lower federal court statutory interpretation
through a different approach. It reviews the seventy-two federal court of
appeals decisions that cite King v. Burwell during the two-year period following
its issuance. The selection of King as a starting point is intentional. While
perhaps not representative of the entire corpus of federal statutory interpretation
jurisprudence, the seventy-two cases that cite King are likeliest to embrace (or
strongly reject) the kind of purposive moves made by the Supreme Court in
King. They are also somewhat more likely to contain an explicit discussion of
interpretive method. Finally, two years’ worth of cases generates a sample
sufficiently large to obscure the effect of outliers and permit some tentative
observations to be reached.
The results of this study reveal a dynamic landscape in which courts seem
relatively uncommitted to ideological battles over interpretive principles,
notwithstanding a relatively small number of opinions which contain rhetorical
flourishes in this area.20 Courts freely pursue the best reading of statutory text
through textual and purposive means: linguistic analysis of the words,
contextual readings of multiple statutory provisions and analysis of the
statutory scheme, and evidence of purpose gleaned from textual and extratextual sources.21 While not pervasive, legislative history appears commonly
in these cases.22
This study divides the cases based upon whether text and purpose appear to
be in tension or harmony. Throughout all categories, there are numerous

18. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1761–70 (2010).
19. See Gluck & Posner, supra note 16, at 1300.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 840 F.3d 879, 884
(7th Cir. 2016); In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d 98, 118 (2d Cir. 2016);
United States v. Epskamp, 832 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2016); Hernandez v. Williams, 829 F.3d 1068,
1078 (9th Cir. 2016); G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist., 802 F.3d 601, 621 (3d Cir. 2015); In re Google
Inc. Cookie Placement & Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 147 (3d Cir. 2015); see also infra
note 415.
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examples of courts pursuing the best result through text and purpose, using a
wide range of evidence, including legislative history.23
Cases where text and purpose appear to be in tension or at odds require that
courts decide when and whether to consider purpose and what kind of evidence
or purpose to admit.24 In these cases, courts are attuned to the relative clarity
of the text and the relation between the apparent plain meaning of the text and
the apparent purpose of the provision within the statute as a whole.25 Some
sixteen cases in the set use purpose to resolve questions on which statutory text
is silent, internally conflicted, or at odds with the court’s view of purpose.26
These cases depend on a wide array of evidence and arguments.27 Most cite
legislative history.28 Nine cases in which text and purpose are in tension reject
purposive readings and stick with text in the face of arguments that text and
purpose conflict.29 A few of these cases contain language that explicitly
questions the legitimacy of purposive interpretation or the use of extra-textual
evidence.30 Yet, a large number of these cases also cite legislative history.31 In
twenty-two cases, text and purpose appear not to be at odds.32 In those cases,
courts freely consult context, statutory structure and scheme, statutory purpose
to confirm their readings of text.33 Legislative history is cited in five of these
cases.34
Moreover, given an opportunity to weigh into the statutory construction
wars explicitly and in a way that could (at least in theory) control the lower
federal courts, the Supreme Court has refused to do so.35 Thus, for the
foreseeable future, the courts of appeal are likely to continue taking an eclectic

23. See infra Section III.B.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra note 259.
27. See infra Section III.B.
28. See supra note 22.
29. See infra Section III.C.
30. See infra Section III.C.2.
31. See, e.g., In re Settoon Towing, L.L.C., 859 F.3d 340, 352 (5th Cir. 2017); Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2016); In re Schwartz-Tallard, 803 F.3d 1095, 1100
(9th Cir. 2015).
32. See infra Section III.D.
33. See infra Section III.D.
34. See infra note 412 and accompanying text.
35. See infra Part IV.
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approach, although it will be important to return to this research to consider the
impact of judges appointed by Donald Trump.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly surveys the landscape of
academic discussion surrounding statutory interpretation.36 It summarizes
differences in method and basic jurisprudential philosophy between New
Textualist and purposive schools of interpretation, ultimately concluding that
the differences are quite narrow.37 Part III summarizes the issues raised by King
v. Burwell and assesses the textual and purposive moves in the case.38
Ultimately, it concludes that King demonstrates the sort of pragmatic approach
to interpretation that is common in the lower courts.39 Part IV discusses court
of appeals cases that cite King in the two years following its issuance.40
Following a note about the method of this study, this Part divides the cases into
three categories: cases that embrace purposive readings of text, cases that rely
on a textual approach, and cases where text and purpose do not conflict.41 Most
courts across these categories take a pragmatic, encompassing approach to
statutes, considering text and purpose, and in a substantial number of cases,
looking to legislative history for guidance. Part V considers the significance of
two cases where courts of appeals reached strongly purposive results only to be
overturned by the Supreme Court in opinions that do not mandate a narrow
textualist approach to interpretation.42 In view of these developments, the paper
concludes that pragmatism is likely to continue as the order of the day in the
lower courts, thought the impact of judges appointed by Donald Trump will
have to be assessed through further study.43
II. DO THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION MATTER?
The legal community has long weighed the question of how a court should
treat enacted legislative text when it is called on to decide meaning. For a court

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
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trying to interpret or construe44 legislation, the three canonical starting points
have been statutory text, statutory purpose, and legislative intent.45
These three starting points have spawned a vast, fascinating commentary.
Scholars have proffered numerous theories of statutory interpretation.46 Judges,
on the front lines of statutory interpretation wars, have also produced articulate
and eloquent justifications for various positions.47 In the past twenty or so
years, looking principally to the Supreme Court, the two main approaches to
interpretation have been the “New Textualism” championed by Justice Antonin
Scalia and others,48 and a modern approach to Purposivism, which has been

44. For a discussion of the differences between interpretation and construction, see Lawrence B.
Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 100–08 (2010) (“As I
discuss the distinction, I will use constitutional interpretation and construction in an illustrative context,
but the distinction itself applies whenever an authoritative legal text is applied or explicated.”). On
Solum’s account of the distinction, interpretation is an attempt to ascertain linguistic meaning while
construction is the process of assigning legal effect to the semantic content of an authoritative legal
text. Id. at 100, 103. For purposes of this article, I will use the term “statutory interpretation,”
recognizing that this process often involves both interpretation and construction, particularly in cases
where interpretation is insufficient to decide the matter in question because of linguistic ambiguity or
conflict among particular statutory provisions.
45. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321–22 n.2 (1990) (referring to intent, purpose, and text as
“foundational” approaches, and identifying such an approach in pure form as “a theory that identifies
a single primary legitimate source of interpretation . . . and adheres to the statutory meaning that source
suggests, regardless of circumstances or consequences”).
46. Scholarly commentary in this area is vast. For a general overview and commentary, see
generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1999); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 45, at 324–45. A “Brief Overview of the
Mainstream Debates” may be found in Gluck, supra note 18, at 1761–70.
47. For the work of judges, compare Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS. & THE LAW 3, 3 (Amy Guttman Ed., 1997)
(espousing a textualist perspective), with STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 17–18 (2005) (advocating a purposive approach), and KATZMANN,
supra note 1, at 31 (“[T]he fundamental task . . . is to interpret language in light of the statute’s
purpose(s) as enacted by legislators, with particular attention to those legislative materials that reliably
contribute to understanding the statute’s meaning.”); see also Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817–18 (1983)
(imaginative reconstruction); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286–
90 (1985).
48. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 15–16; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990).
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described as “textually constrained,”49 and is most prominently espoused by
Justice Breyer.50
A brief description of these differences sets the stage for the issues that
dominate King v. Burwell and its progeny. Each philosophy has its own
methods of interpretation, preferred evidence, and underlying assumptions.
Understanding the context of the New Textualism and modern Purposivism
permits a judgment to be made about King v. Burwell’s true legacy and the
effects it may have in the lower federal courts.
A. The New Textualism
The New Textualism, associated primarily with Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas, has been ascendant at the Supreme Court of the United States
for the better part of the last twenty-five years.51 Justice Scalia has identified
the object of interpretation as looking for “‘objectified’ intent—the intent that
a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the
remainder of the corpus juris.”52 Scalia derides the search for legislative intent
from extra-textual sources as undemocratic, a process that provides “handy
cover for judicial intent.”53 Scalia consequently concludes that “[t]he text is the
law, and it is the text that must be observed.”54
This elevation of text has important ramifications for the kinds of evidence
a court may accept to determine what the law is. The tools of textualism are

49. Manning, supra note 4, at 118–19 (arguing that even the Supreme Court’s nontextualist
members “rely on the text to structure and constrain their use of purpose”); Gluck, supra note 18, at
1764–65 (“[T]extualism has had a significant impact across the spectrum, leading ‘even nonadherents
to give great weight to statutory text.’”).
50. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007
SUP. CT. REV. 51, 86 (referring to Justice Breyer, along with Justice Stevens, as the Court’s “most
committed purposivists”); Manning, supra note 4, at 128 (identifying Justices Breyer and Stevens as
“the Court’s strongest purposivists”).
51. Manning, supra note 4, at 114 (“While one can point to the rare exception, the Court in the
last two decades has mostly treated as uncontroversial its duty to adhere strictly to the terms of a clear
statutory text, even when doing so produces results that fit poorly with the apparent purposes that
inspired the enactment.”) (citation omitted).
52. Scalia, supra note 47, at 17.
53. Id. at 17–18; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1,
at xxii–xxiii.
54. Scalia, supra note 47, at 22.

CEDRONE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE)

52

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

12/3/2019 7:50 PM

[103:43

well-known: a textualist judge will consult dictionaries,55 textual context,56 and
canons of construction, which are linguistic presumptions about legislation’s
meaning.57
Beyond use of these tools, there are two additional defining features of
modern textualism: substantial limitations on the use of purpose, and a rejection
of legislative history as a legitimate source of meaning.58 Textualist judges will
make reference to the purpose of the statute in a limited way.59 Purpose must
be derived from the text of the statute,60 that is, from “concrete manifestations
as deduced from close reading of the text.”61 On this view, purpose may not be

55. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The United
States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 86
(2010) (charting an increase in dictionary use in Court opinions from the 1970s to the 1980s and the
1980s to the 1990s, but finding a flattening of the rate of use in the first decade of the 2000s); see also
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 69–77 (describing and defending use of dictionaries as part of the
“Ordinary-Meaning Canon”); id. at 415–24 (Appendix A: A Note on the Use of Dictionaries).
56. Gluck, supra note 18, at 1763 n.37 (“‘Context’ generally refers to how the contested term
fits into the statutory scheme as a whole—e.g., how it is used in other statutes, or later in the same
statute.”).
57. Scalia, supra note 47, at 25–29; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 53–411 (describing
canons of construction in great detail). To be sure, reliance on canons has not gone unchallenged,
dating back to the 1950s, when Karl Llewellyn declared “there are two opposing canons on almost
every point.” Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). Not surprisingly,
Justice Scalia has rejected Llewellyn’s attack on multiple occasions. Scalia, supra note 47, at 26–27;
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 59–62 (rejecting Llewellyn and defending the use of canons). A
more recent and substantial attack on the canons comes from Professors Bressman and Gluck, whose
empirical work suggests that many canons of construction are not well-known among legislative
drafters working for the United States Congress. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the
Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 728 (2014); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the
Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 926 (2013).
58. Manning, supra note 4, at 123–24 (defining the rejection of legislative history as a source of
meaning and the rejection of purpose to trump clear text as the “two major components” of “the new
textualism”); Gluck, supra note 18, at 1765 (“A judge who acknowledges the importance of text but
still takes various positions from case to case regarding whether text trumps other interpretive tools is
not a textualist.”).
59. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). See, e.g., In re Wright, 826 F.3d 774, 779,
782–83 (4th Cir. 2016); Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 689 n.41 (7th Cir.
2016).
60. See discussion supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
61. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 20.
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used to “contradict text or to supplement it”; to do so would disrespect the
democratic compromise encapsulated in the legislative text.62
Further, when textualists rely on purpose, they require that it be “defined
precisely” and “described . . . concretely.”63 At a broad enough level of
generality, any result could be sustained, regardless of text. The textualist
interpreter will generally limit her consideration to the specific purposes of the
particular provision at issue, seen in the context of the structure and language
of the statute as a whole.64 As an evidentiary matter, textually defined purpose
does not admit evidence beyond plain meaning, statutory structure, context, and
canons.65 Instead, it relies on text and textual context to be used to better define
and understand the language of particular provisions.66
Most prominently, textualism rejects legislative history and other extrinsic
sources (such as “assumptions about the legal drafter’s desires”) as evidence of
purpose.67 Textualists reject legislative history because they harbor deep
skepticism about whether statements contained in legislative history actually
reflect the will of the enacting majority and because they consider it illegitimate
to grant legislative history the same authoritative status as duly enacted
statutory text.68

62. Id. at 57 (“[T]he limitations of a text—what a text chooses not to do—are as much a part of
its ‘purpose’ as its affirmative dispositions.”).
63. Id. at 56–57.
64. Id. at 167.
65. Id. at 53–76, 156–60.
66. Id.
67. Scalia, supra note 47, at 29–37; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 56; see also Manning,
supra note 4, at 123–24. There is some irony here. The canons of construction are quite obviously
extrinsic to statutory text, and recent work discussed above (Gluck and Bressman articles) suggests
they are not universally known among legislative drafters, but they are admitted as legitimate evidence
of meaning by textualists while legislative history is not.
68. Manning, supra note 4, at 123–24. This skepticism has been noted to be an outgrowth of
public choice view of the legislative process, which holds that because “legislation is a product of
compromises among groups, . . . attributing a purpose to a statute either may improperly privilege the
interests of one group over another (thereby undermining the bargain) or may impute a purpose where
none (other than the desire to reach agreement) existed.” T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory
Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 28 (1988). The literature here is vast: representative cites must
suffice. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547–48 (1983); Kenneth
A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 239, 244–45 (1992).

CEDRONE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE)

54

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

12/3/2019 7:50 PM

[103:43

The jurisprudential philosophy of textualists is rooted in realist institutional
views about the work of Congress and the proper role of courts.69 Textualists’
vision of Congress’ work is at once encompassing and skeptical. It is
encompassing in that textualists seek to vindicate legislative supremacy by
respecting Congress’ power to define rules of law (through its enacted text) that
bind all other governmental actors, including judges.70 It is skeptical in that
textualists do not trust efforts to understand Congressional intent from any
source other than enacted text.71
The implication of textualism for judges is a much more limited role. By
valorizing text and rejecting legislative history, textualists seek to cabin judicial
discretion: judges are to “interpret” and not “make” law.72 The view reflects “a
new appreciation of the judiciary’s limited role in the constitutional structure
and of the dangers of judicial self-aggrandizement.”73 As such, judges are
“agent[s]” and not “partners[]” of the legislature when they interpret statutes,
and must defer to duly enacted Congressional pronouncements with only a
limited role for judicial discretion.74
B. Textually Constrained Purposivism
For all the influence that textualism has had in recent decades, purposive
interpretation is still an important part of the modern landscape, as King v.
Burwell itself illustrates.75 The archetypical case illustrating a strong purposive
approach—dating from 1892—is Holy Trinity Church v. United States.76 In
Holy Trinity, the Supreme Court had to decide whether a statute that forbade
anyone from “in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any
69. Molot, supra note 5, at 25 (“Textualism’s core interpretive theory found its origins in legal
realism.”).
70. Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified
Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1988).
71. See Molot, supra note 5, at 26–29; see also Manning, supra note 4, at 123–24.
72. Gluck, supra note 18, at 1763; see also Molot, supra note 5, at 26–29 (describing
textualism’s affinity with Erie and Chevron doctrines as reflecting “both a realist appreciation of the
leeway inherent in interpretation and a formalist aspiration to cabin that leeway.”).
73. Molot, supra note 5, at 29.
74. EVA H. HANKS, MICHAEL E. HERZ, & STEVEN S. NEMERSON, ELEMENTS OF LAW 253–54
(2d ed. 2010).
75. Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’ Plan in the
Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 81 (2015) (observing that King v. Burwell is
decided using “objectified, text-derived purpose”).
76. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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way assist or encourage the importation or migration” of an “alien” or
“foreigner” into the United States under contract “to perform labor or service
of any kind” applied to the Rev. E. Walpole Warren, called in 1887 from the
United Kingdom to the rectorship of Holy Trinity Church in New York City.77
The Court’s crucial move in Holy Trinity divorced legal effect from the
semantic meaning of the text; put differently, the Court used purpose to trump
text.78 While acknowledging that the contract between the church and Warren
was indeed “within the letter of this section,” the Court nonetheless held that
the contract did not violate the statute because it was “not within its spirit nor
within the intention of its makers.”79 Along the way, the Court observed that
the purpose of the statute was to keep “cheap unskilled labor” out of the
country80 and that, as legislature of a “Christian nation,” the Congress can
hardly have seriously intended to prevent the entry of a minister.81 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court analyzed “the title of the act, the evil which was
intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress,
[and] the reports of the committee of each house.”82 Indeed, the Court quotes
legislative history from both the Senate and House of Representatives in
support of its view of the legislative purpose.83
The holding in Holy Trinity is a high-water mark for the use of purpose. In
the face of clear text, the Court departed from the semantic meaning of the
words in order to effectuate what it considered to be the Congressional purpose

77. Id. at 457–58.
78. Id. at 458–59.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 465.
81. Id. at 471. The Court noted that the statute contained specific exceptions for “professional
actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic servants,” but was not troubled by the lack of a textual
exception for ministers. Id. at 458–59. It is tempting to deconstruct the Court’s assumptions about
“unskilled laborers” and the character of the United States as a “Christian nation” in 1892, id. at 471,
but those temptations do not further the ends of this article and are best addressed separately.
82. Id. at 465.
83. Id. at 464–65.
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of the statute.84 There has been much commentary about this decision,85 but
there is little doubt that this approach has profoundly influenced courts in the
United States, in particular after the New Deal.86 In United States v. American
Trucking Associations Inc., the Court observed that when plain meaning
produced an “unreasonable” result “plainly at variance with the policy of the
legislation as a whole,” the Court would “follow[] that purpose, rather than the
literal words.”87 The scope of purpose, and consequently the power of the
Court, is quite broad: on this view, the Court will disregard text not only when
the result is absurd (a modest claim even embraced to some extent by milder
schools of textualism), but the Court will cast text aside when it is merely
unreasonable.88
Modern purposivists rarely go so far. As discussed further below, modern
purposivism is perhaps best described as “textually constrained.”89 In many
ways, this is the result of the New Textualism.90 It is not uncommon to read
cases from the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state courts from
judges of all stripes that pronounce: where the language of the statute is clear,
that is the end of the matter.91
As to the question of legislative history, modern textualists are also
cautious. In her confirmation hearings, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg described
her own attitude when consulting legislative history as one of “hopeful

84. In more complete historical accounts, academics have differentiated between intentionalism
and purposivism. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION 19–20 (2010) (differentiating “intentionalism” as the attempt to focus on the legislative
intent of a specific provision from “purposivism” as taking account of general statutory purposes);
HANKS, HERZ, & NEMERSON, supra note 74, at 264 (using intent to refer to “what the legislature meant,
the specific understanding it had in mind” and purpose to refer to “what it is the legislature ultimately
sought to accomplish”). Because the current sketch is intended only to set the stage for a discussion
of modern approaches to statutes, this distinction does not figure prominently in the discussion above.
85. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 47, at 18–23; Manning, supra note 4, at 122.
86. Manning, supra note 4, at 122 (purposivism “reached its apogee after the New Deal”).
87. 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922)).
88. See Manning, supra note 4, at 129–30.
89. Id. at 118; see infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
90. See Manning, supra note 4, at 146–47.
91. See Manning, supra note 4, at 125–30 n.66–86 (citing example cases from the Supreme
Court); see also KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 29 (“When statutes are unambiguous, . . . the inquiry for
a court generally ends with an examination of the words of the statute.”); Gluck, supra note 18, at
1819.
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skepticism.”92 More recently, Chief Judge Robert Katzmann of the Second
Circuit has penned a brief but influential book entitled Judging Statutes, which
argues in favor of courts consulting “authoritative” and “reliabl[e]” legislative
history.93 Katzmann argues for treating different forms of legislative history
differently.94 At the top of the paradigm are committee reports, which “have
long been important means of informing the whole chamber about proposed
legislation” and are “often the primary means by which staffs brief their
principals before voting on a bill.”95 The views of Justice Ginsburg and Chief
Judge Katzmann demonstrate a sound basis for careful, educated use of
legislative history in purposive statutory interpretation.96
The jurisprudential view of purposivists sways between the idea that courts
must be faithful agents of Congress when they interpret statutes and the idea
that courts partner with Congress to effect the intended statutory purpose.97
Judge Katzmann’s book reflects this tension.98 He believes that “the role of the
courts is to interpret the law in a way that is faithful to its meaning . . . not to

92. Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 224 (1993).
93. KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 29, 31. For a thoughtful and sympathetic review, see John F.
Manning, Why Does Congress Vote on Some Texts But Not Others?, 51 TULSA L. REV. 559, 559 (2016)
(calling Judging Statutes a “great book”).
94. KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 29.
95. Id. at 19. Katzmann recognizes that careful and modest use of legislative history requires
courts to know more about the workings of Congress so they can better differentiate various types of
Congressional work-product. Id. at 22. In support of this view, Judge Katzmann points to an influential
empirical study by Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman that finds that “legislative history was
emphatically viewed by almost all of our respondents—Republicans and Democrats, majority and
minority, alike—as the most important drafting and interpretive tool apart from text.” Id. at 37 (citing
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 57, at 965).
The work of Professor Victoria Nourse broadens and deepens Judge Katzmann’s observations,
offering “five rule-based decision theory Principles, akin to canons, for judges and lawyers to make
readings of legislative history more objective.” Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory
Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 76–77, 90–134 (Nourse’s rules are
the following: (1) know Congress’s rules; (2) focus on the most recent legislative decision first; (3)
proximity to text and specificity to the interpretive issue are central to the most reliable history; (4)
never cite losers’ history as an authoritative source of textual meaning; and (5) congress does not play
by judicial rules).
96. The principal objection to Judge Katzmann’s book and to work advocating use of legislative
history generally is that Congress does not vote on committee reports, even when it plainly could. See
Manning, supra note 93, at 561–62.
97. HANKS, HERZ, & NEMERSON, supra note 74, at 253–54.
98. KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 29–31.
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substitute its judgment or to alter the terms of the statute.”99 However, he also
embraces use of purpose so that “Congress will perceive the courts as
productive partners . . .”100
Purposive interpreters are fundamentally optimistic about their own ability
to figure out what Congress was trying to accomplish.101 This optimism grows
out of the Legal Process school of Hart and Sacks, whose defining advice is
that courts should assume in difficult cases that “the legislature was made up of
reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably,”102 Hart and
Sacks have been accused of inconsistency because they appear to recognize the
important of text yet also hold that text should sometimes yield to purpose.103
Their view has also been critiqued as being based on undue optimism about the
courts’ ability to discern Congress’ purposes.104 However, their central
contribution is that legislature and court partner to effect the Congressional
purpose, and this view supports judges in a robust inquiry into the purpose of
legislation.105

99. Id. at 29.
100. Id. at 10; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 405, 434–35 (1989) (“Legal process approaches stand poised somewhere between agency
theories of the judicial role and understandings of an altogether different sort.”).
101. KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 33–34.
102. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip C. Frickey eds.,
1994).
103. John F. Manning, Justice Ginsburg and the New Legal Process, 127 HARV. L. REV. 455,
455–56 (2013) (“[T]he Legal Process materials developed by Harvard Professors Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks presented two conflicting techniques for effectuating statutory purpose.”). The first
technique is the familiar textual constraint: “[J]udges must not ‘give the words . . . a meaning they will
not bear.’” Id. at 455. The second is the apparent assumption that text can at times yield to purpose.
Id. at 455–56.
104. Sunstein, supra note 100, at 435.
105. Subsequent theorists have carried the partnership idea much further. Addressing the
difficult problem of how to apply older statutes in newer circumstances, Professor William Eskridge
posits that statutory interpretation is and should be “dynamic”; that is, “as the distance between
enactment and interpretation increases, a pure originalist inquiry becomes impossible and/or
irrelevant.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 5–6 (1994).
Eskridge argues that this thesis is both descriptive (i.e. it says what courts do) and normative (i.e. it
describes what courts should do). Id. at 6. This theory explores how deeply purposive readings of
statutory text support legislative intent.
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C. Setting the Stage for King v. Burwell
The courts for a long time have dwelt in a place of interpretive pluralism.
Less charitably, once could accuse the courts of inconsistency, or even disarray,
much as Hart and Sacks did fifty years ago, declaring the “hard truth of the
matter” to be “that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted,
and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”106 These concerns
continue to occupy scholars today, with calls for consistent interpretive rules to
be followed by courts107 or even imposed by Congress.108
Looking to the practical world of the courts, some have argued that a merger
of sorts between purposivism and textualism seems to have taken place.109
Professor John Molot of Georgetown considers the differences between
textualist and purposivist scholars to be “narrow.”110 Professor John Manning
of Harvard, in evaluating members of the Supreme Court in 2011 says that most
are “textually constrained purposivists” or “purpose-sensitive textualists,” and
106. HART & SACKS, supra note 102, at 1169.
107. See Gluck, supra note 18, at 1767–68, 1848–55 (defending methodological consistency in
statutory interpretation).
108. See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002) (arguing that Congress should exercise its constitutional power to dictate
the tools for courts’ interpretation of federal statutes). Of course, not everyone views this situation as
particularly problematic. Professor Eskridge, like the courts he studies, pushes away from “grand
theory” which privileges one or another “foundational” theory, positing a theory of “practical
reasoning” which has both descriptive and normative power for understanding the process of
interpretation as it is actually undertaken by courts. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 45, at 321–23.
More recent academic writing has suggested a hierarchy among the foundational interpretive foci and
the evidence that supports them. See Gluck, supra note 18, at 1758 (arguing for “modified textualism”
which looks to text, legislative history, and interpretive canons in that order).
109. Molot, supra note 5, at 35–36 (“[T]hat which unites textualists and purposivists seems to
outweigh that which divides them.”); see also Manning, supra note 4, at 146–47.
110. Molot, supra note 5, at 4. Molot identifies three potential differences; he claims that one is
real but exaggerated in importance and the other two illusory. Id. at 36–43. The real-but-exaggerated
difference concerns textualists’ rejection and purposivists’ embrace of legislative history. Id. at 38–
39; see infra notes 67–68, 92–96, and accompanying text. The illusory distinctions concern how likely
an interpreter is to find an ambiguity that invites consideration of purpose; this distinction is illusory,
claims Molot, because the tendency to see language as clear of ambiguity is not correlated to
interpretive philosophy. Id. at 39–42. Finally, a third potential difference concerns when it is
appropriate to look to context: “Textualists accuse purposivists of continuing to look to context after
they have arrived at a clear textual meaning.” Id. at 36–37 (emphasis in original). However, this too
is illusory: “[T]o the extent that both schools use the same interpretive tools to reach the same
interpretive result, it really does not matter if one purports to use context to decide on a textual meaning
while the other admits that it is adjusting the text’s meaning to reconcile it with context.” Id. at 37–
38.
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suggests that these two positions “may be the same thing.”111 Most centrally,
if both a textualist and purposivist inquiry are limited by the reasonable sematic
meaning of the text, again in the words of Molot, “[W]e are all textualists in an
important sense.”112
Yet, Molot is correct that a “narrow” distinction remains. After starting
with text and context, textualists will diverge into canons of construction and
purposivists will likely consult legislative history.113 The textualist will not
depart from semantic meaning (informed by context and sometimes purpose)
even in the face of very strong evidence of contrary legislative intent.114 A
purposivist will recognize the importance of text but read that text in light of its
apparent purposes and will sometimes reach results that are in tension with the
language of the statute.115
In light of the current state of affairs, King v. Burwell has much to offer. In
many ways, the case reflects the state of the judiciary today: the Court uses
many tools to find meaning: text, context and scheme, and purpose.116 In
reaching its result, the Court avoids legislative history.117 The result itself is
unusual: the Court makes sense of the statutory scheme, to the point of avoiding
the implications of plain text.118 While purposive in its basic orientation, the
case reflects the relatively narrow distance between textualists and
purposivists.119

111. Manning, supra note 4, at 146–47 (identifying Justices Breyer and Stevens as embracing
Holy Trinity-style purposivism and Justices Scalia and Thomas as embracing New Textualism); see
also id. at 113 (observing in 2010 that the Supreme Court “has not cited Holy Trinity positively for
more than two decades”).
112. Molot, supra note 5, at 43.
113. Sunstein, supra note 100, at 429. In view of the powerful critique of textualists, reliance
on legislative history has declined in recent decades. See generally David S. Law & David Zaring,
Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1653, 1671–72 n.73–79 (2010) (empirical study; includes some information about lower federal
courts at notes 73–79 and accompanying text).
114. The textualist will only depart from a textual interpretation in the very rare case of drafting
error or more limited conceptions of absurdity. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 234–39
(discussing drafting error and the absurdity doctrine and noting limitations on the absurdity doctrine).
115. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
116. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489–96 (2015).
117. See id.
118. Id. at 2490.
119. See id. at 2495.
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III. KING V. BURWELL AND THE USE OF TEXT AND PURPOSE
A close reading of the opinion and the dissent in King v. Burwell bears out
the observation that all interpreters on the Supreme Court now give great weight
to text.120 Nonetheless, the seemingly plain meaning of the statutory phrase
“established by the State” does not control the outcome of the case.121 In King,
the Court either interprets this phrase expansively or indeed pushes past its
reasonable semantic meaning.122 If the holding pushes past the reasonable
semantic meaning of the text, then the case finds an important limit on the
identified merger between textualism and purposivism because statutory
purpose appears to trump the plain meaning of the text.123 Even if the case
merely reads “established by the State” expansively, it is still important for its
use of purpose and scheme to read a statutory provision in the broadest possible
terms.
The King majority follows a unique interpretive path in the case. The Court
views the case as exceptional; the majority explicitly finds it so when deciding
the Chevron issue.124 The majority then proceeds to engage deeply with the
Congressional purposes for enacting the statute; indeed, the Court even begins,
in a cursory and not entirely accurate way, to engage with the legislative process
of the Affordable Care Act.125 Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the
case engages in prudential reasoning, looking to likely real-world implications
of various constructions of the statute.126
This Section begins with a brief description of the legal issues in King,
follows with some analysis of the textual arguments, and concludes with a
description of the purposive arguments that lead the majority to hold as it does.

120. Id. at 2488–92, 2502–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495.
122. 135 S. Ct. at 2490. The Court suggests that an expansive reading is appropriate when it
observes that “the Act may not always use the phrase ‘established by the State’ in its most natural
sense.” Id. The dissent is considerably more direct: if the Court’s reading of “established by the State”
is correct, “words no longer have meaning.” Id. at 2497.
123. Molot, supra note 5, at 35–43; supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
124. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
125. Id. at 2490–92.
126. Id. at 2492–94.
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A. The Statutory Challenge to the Affordable Care Act
There is little doubt that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act127
was passed and has been implemented in an atmosphere of partisan political
division and rancor.128 After an epic legal battle over the constitutionality of
statute’s mandate that individuals purchase health insurance and the statute’s
conditional expansion of Medicaid funding,129 the Supreme Court two terms
later took up an enormously consequential question of statutory
interpretation.130
The terms of the statute appear plain: states are permitted but not required
to establish Exchanges, which are markets designed to sell health insurance to
individuals.131 Should a state refuse to establish an Exchange, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services is directed to step in to “establish and operate such
Exchange” within that state.132 These two forms of Exchanges have
colloquially become known as the State Exchanges and the Federal
Exchange.133
For individuals with incomes between 100 and 400 percent of the federal
poverty level, subsidies are available in the form of federal income tax credits;
these subsidies offset the cost of health insurance purchased on an Exchange.134
And now, the troublesome provision: the tax credit is available to taxpayers
whose insurance plan was purchased on “an Exchange established by the
State.”135 Thus, the Court must decide whether tax credits are available to
taxpayers who live in states on the Federal Exchange, or whether they are only
available to taxpayers in states that have chosen to establish State Exchanges?
The consequences of eliminating subsidies on the Federal Exchange would
have been enormous. Without the tax credit subsidy, individuals would have
been required to bear the full cost of premiums for insurance plans purchased

127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001−121 (2010).
128. Tessa Berenson, Reminder: The House Voted to Repeal Obamacare More Than 50 Times,
TIME
(Mar.
24,
2017),
https://time.com/4712725/ahca-house-repeal-votes-obamacare/
[https://perma.cc/L7VA-62TR].
129. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
130. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2480.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2010).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2010).
133. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487.
134. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a), (b)(3)(A)(i) (2012).
135. Id. § 36B(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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through the Federal Exchange.136 Should an individual’s cost for premiums on
the least expensive plan exceed 8 percent of household income, that individual
would be no longer mandated to purchase insurance.137 As the Court explained,
without a mandate to purchase insurance, healthier people would be less likely
to do so, resulting in increasing premiums.138 These premium increases would
eventually render insurance unaffordable for all and drive insurers out of the
marketplace.139 The Court referred to this phenomenon as an “economic ‘death
spiral’” and pointed to the experience of many states in the 1990s as evidence
of these dire consequences.140
As is well known by this point, the Court found that subsidies are available
on both the State Exchanges and the Federal Exchange.141 To reach this result,
the Court took three legal steps.142 First, it determined that it would not defer
to IRS regulations, even though those regulations reached the same result as the
Court.143 Declaring this an “extraordinary case[]” of “deep ‘economic and
political significance,’” the Court declared, “This is not a case for the IRS.”144
Second, it determined that the critical language “an Exchange established by
136. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493.
137. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(A) (2012).
138. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2484.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2482.
141. Id. at 2496.
142. Id. at 2488–96.
143. Id. at 2488–89.
144. Id. The circuit split that brought the case to the Supreme Court involved a difference over
the deference due the IRS interpretation. The Fourth Circuit viewed the statutory language as
“ambiguous and subject to at least two different interpretations” and deferred to the IRS interpretation.
King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 372, 376 (4th Cir. 2014) (deferring to the IRS under Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). On the same day the Fourth Circuit opinion
issued, the D.C. Circuit vacated the IRS rule, holding that the language of the statute unambiguously
forbids tax credit subsidies on the Federal Exchange. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (finding that Chevron deference did not apply because the language unambiguously forbid the
agency’s reading).
Notably, Justice Scalia, writing for himself, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito in dissent, did not
cite Chevron, although his view of the statute accords with the Chevron framework. Justice Scalia
finds no ambiguity in the statute: the meaning of “established by the State” is to him “obvious—so
obvious there would hardly be a need for the Supreme Court to hear a case about it.” King, 135 S. Ct.
at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The clear import of this reasoning is that there would be no need for
agency deference: at so-called Chevron step one, the court decides whether a statute is ambiguous or
not and enforces the plain meaning of the language if it is not ambiguous. Id. at 2488 (citing Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842–43).
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the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031]” is ambiguous.145 Finally, considering the
“context and structure” of the Act, the Court concluded that the provision in
question “allows tax credits for insurance purchased on any Exchange created
under the Act.”146
B. The Court’s Reasoning: Text and Purpose
Most of the Court’s opinion in King v. Burwell turns on two modes of
analysis: a deep look at the text, context, and structure of the statute and what
one might call prudential or pragmatic analysis of the consequences of various
interpretations of the statute.147 The text-context-structure analysis is a very
familiar form of analysis rooted in text, although executed in this case in a way
that seems to subordinate text to purpose and scheme.148 The prudential or
pragmatic analysis has its eye on the consequences of particular
interpretations.149
1. Text-Context-Structure
a. Using Structure to Set the Stage
The stage is set for the Court’s textualist analysis through a five-page
discussion of the ACA’s scheme and Congress’ purposes in enacting the
ACA.150 This structural understanding of the statute is clear from the first
sentence, which recognizes the ACA’s “series of interlocking reforms designed
to expand coverage in the individual health insurance market.”151 The Court
proceeds to describe these three interlocking reforms. The first reform consists
of two parts: a “guaranteed issue” requirement which “bar[s] insurers from
denying coverage to any person because of his [or her] health” and a
“community rating” requirement which “bar[s] insurers from charging a person
higher premiums for the same reason.”152 The second reform consists of an

145. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491.
146. Id. at 2495–96.
147. Id. at 2488–96.
148. See id. at 2489.
149. In the words of Professor William Eskridge, “A pragmatic interpretation is one that most
intelligently and creatively ‘fits’ into the complex web of social and legal practices.” ESKRIDGE, supra
note 105, at 201.
150. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485–89.
151. Id. at 2485.
152. Id.
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individual mandate, which “require[s] individuals to buy insurance or pay a
penalty.”153 Finally, the third reform provides “tax credits to certain individuals
to ensure that they could afford the insurance they were required to buy.”154
Unusually, the Court cites the Congressional findings that are part of the
ACA for the proposition that “the guaranteed issue and community rating
requirements would not work without the coverage requirement.”155 In the
statute, Congress finds that the individual mandate “together with the other
provisions of this Act” is necessary to broaden participation in the health
insurance pools and thereby guarantee a functioning health insurance market.156
The Court spells out one of the more crucial “other provisions,” by declaring
without further citation that the individual mandate “would not work
without . . . tax credits,” and finds further evidence for its view that the three
reforms are inextricably intertwined in the fact that the statute provides that the
three reforms should take effect on the same day.157
In a section of the opinion that has had important influences on
administrative law,158 the Court also casts aside the notion that it owes Chevron
deference to the Internal Revenue Service, which interpreted the statute to
provide tax credits to individuals who obtained insurance on the Federal
Exchange.159 In a scant two paragraphs, the Court concludes “[t]his is not a
case for the IRS,” finding that the case is “extraordinary” and the matter should
therefore be decided by the Court because the question is one of “deep

153. Id. at 2486.
154. Id. The credits at issue are refundable tax credits, and they are available to individuals with
household incomes between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line. Id. at 2487.
155. Id. at 2487 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (2010)).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (2010).
157. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487.
158. See David Gamage, Forward—King v. Burwell Symposium: Comments on the
Commentaries (And on Some Elephants in the Room), 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2015) and the
accompanying articles in the Symposium Issue, particularly Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan,
King v. Burwell: What Does It Portend for Chevron’s Domain?, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 72 (2015).
159. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. The IRS interpretation of the statute can be found at 77 Fed. Reg.
30377, 30378 (May 23, 2012). See also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–43 (1984). Chevron requires agencies to follow clear statutory commands but permits
agencies to adopt reasonable constructions of ambiguous statutory language. Id. Thus, in evaluating
agency action challenged under Chevron, a court first asks whether the statutory language is clear. Id.
at 842. If it is, the court must ensure that the agency follow the statute. Id. at 842–43. If the language
is ambiguous, Chevron requires that the court defer to the agency so long as it has construed the statute
in a permissible way. Id. at 843.
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economic and political significance that is central to [the] statutory scheme.”160
The exception contemplates that Congress would not have left so important a
matter to agency discretion without a clearer indication of its intent to do so.161
In addition to the Court’s philosophic decision not to leave this question to
agency discretion, there is an important pragmatic dimension to the Court’s
Chevron holding.162 If the Court’s opinion treated the case as involving a
question whether to defer to the agency, it could have affirmed the regulation
and saved the subsidies, affirming the reasoning employed by the Fourth
Circuit.163 However, in the future, the IRS controlled by a Presidential
administration hostile to the statute (such as the Trump administration) could
then exercise its regulatory authority to reverse course.164 Because the Court
construed the statute de novo, its holding is not subject to future reversal by
agency regulation.165 At a basic level, the Court’s decision can be read to
support the principle of legislative supremacy by limiting the executive’s ability
to undercut the effectiveness of the statute through interpretation. However, in
doing so, the Court also increases the judicial role by interpreting the statute
with no deference to agency opinions.
Administrative law issues aside, the first five pages of the opinion look
primarily to the structure of the Act to understand that plan.166 Thus, this
section of the opinion examines what the statute attempts to accomplish, its
interlocking reforms intended to do so, and even the history of efforts to address
the problem.167 These considerations—in absence of any Chevron deference

160. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
161. Id. at 2489.
162. For further commentary, see Gluck, supra note 75, at 64–66 (arguing that the Court’s
decision signals that the majority claims a larger role in statutory interpretation cases and that the “real
divide” across the opinions is “how a Court that unanimously agrees on the priority of text-focused
interpretation sees its own role in relation to Congress’ written plans”).
163. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 372−76 (4th Cir. 2014).
164. Prof. Gamage believes that the Court found “deep economic and political significance” at
least partly because of the presence of two deeply divided “epistemic communities” with “different
worldviews and social networks.” Gamage, supra note 158, at 3–5. As Gamage notes, the Court would
have been quite aware that if the Treasury Department were to be “controlled by the other epistemic
community with its different worldview,” a revision of the IRS regulation could be made in short order;
the Court effectively foreclosed this kind of political manipulation of the statute’s meaning based on
partisan politics. Id. at 5.
165. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
166. Id. at 2485–89.
167. Id.
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and the associated insulation of the Court’s interpretation from future
regulatory reversal—provide important context for Court’s textual analysis.168
b. Establishing Textual Ambiguity and Interpreting the Statute
Most of the Court’s textualist arguments occur in the portion of the opinion
that decides that the phrase “an Exchange established by the State under [42
U.S.C. § 18031]” is ambiguous.169 This part of the opinion is prefaced by a
textualist veneer declaration that “plain” statutory language must be
“enforce[d] . . . according to its terms,” quickly followed by caveats that “the
meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident
when placed in context.”170
The Court itself recognizes the difficulty in its mission. Before turning to
context, it candidly makes two admissions: that it might “seem” that a Federal
Exchange cannot be “established by the State,” and that it also might “seem”
that a Federal exchange cannot be “established under 42 U.S.C. § 18031.”171
While the Court does conclude that the provision in question “is properly
viewed as ambiguous,” it concludes that section of the opinion with an odd
circumlocution, saying only that, after reading the provision in context, “we
cannot conclude that the phrase . . . is unambiguous.”172 This underwhelming
conclusion, embedded within a double-negative, nods at the uphill difficulty of
the Court’s textualist arguments.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Court’s principal arguments establishing
ambiguity do not turn on plain meaning.173 Instead, the Court makes
intertextual arguments, referring to how various provisions of the ACA are

168. Id. at 2488.
169. Id. at 2489–92.
170. Id. at 2489 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132
(2000)).
171. Id. at 2490.
172. Id. at 2491–92. In his dissent, Justice Scalia has a field day with this part of the opinion.
He considers the question to be “obvious—so obvious there would hardly be a need for the Supreme
Court to hear a case about it.” Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even more bluntly, Justice Scalia
asks, “Could anyone maintain with a straight face that § 36B is unclear?” Id. at 2502 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brett Kavanaugh commented (before he joined the Supreme Court) that the
ambiguity analysis is already “indeterminate,” and noted that holding “established by the State” to be
ambiguous may have “broader repercussions,” leading “some judges [to] find fewer statutes ‘clear’
because the statutory language in question is no less ambiguous than the phrase ‘established by the
State’ . . . .” Kavanaugh, supra note 3, at 2159.
173. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489–92.
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designed to interact.174 For example, the Court places weight on the language
in 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) that provides that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services “shall . . . establish and operate such Exchange within the
State” if a State elects not to establish its own Exchange.175 The Court
concludes that the word “such” indicates that “State Exchanges and Federal
Exchanges are equivalent—they must meet the same requirements, perform the
same functions, and serve the same purposes.”176 Here the Court uses the word
“such” as a linguistic hook, even providing the Black’s Law Dictionary
definition of the word, to connect the Federal Exchange to the purposes of
Exchanges in the first place, ultimately concluding that Federal and State
Exchanges “do not . . . differ in any meaningful way.”177
The Court turns next to the statutory requirement, contained in § 18031 that
Exchanges “shall make available qualified health plans to qualified
individuals.”178 Section 18032 defines a “qualified individual” in part as one
who “resides in the State that established the Exchange.”179 The Court rests on
the fact that there could be no qualified individuals on the Federal Exchange if
this language were taken at face value, and the Federal Exchange would be
unable to function as an Exchange at all.180
Finally, the Court reads the provision authorizing the Federal
Exchange, § 18041, which contains the “such Exchange” language, as directing
the Secretary of HHS to establish and operate a § 18031 exchange in states that
elect not to set up their own Exchanges.181 In further support of this point, the
Court notes that “[a]ll of the requirements that an Exchange must meet are in
Section 18031, so it is sensible to regard all Exchanges as established under that
provision [i.e. § 18031],” and then points to a number of specific requirements
that are dependent on § 18031.182 The ultimate conclusion the Court reaches
on text is based on these contextual/intertextual arguments.183 Interestingly,

174. Id. at 2490.
175. Id. at 2489 (emphasis in original).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2489–90.
178. Id. at 2490 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(2)(A)).
179. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(1)(A)).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2490–91.
182. Id. at 2491.
183. See id. at 2492 (first citing Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004); and then citing
Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 385 (2013)).
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one of the few canons cited in the Court’s opinions does not control the day.184
Responding to the dissent and the petitioners’ argument that the phrase
“established by the State” are surplusage on the Court’s reading of the statute,185
the Court declares that the canon against surplusage is “not absolute.”186
2. Purposive, Pragmatic, and Prudential Reasoning
The first five pages of the Court’s opinion portend something beyond an
examination of the statutory scheme.187 The Court recounts a detailed history
of attempts to reform the United States health insurance market.188 This history
provides a deep and granular look at the backdrop against which Congress
legislated, suggesting a far deeper dive into Congresses’ purposes than the
single Senate committee hearing cited in this portion of the opinion might
suggest.189
First, the Court’s definition of the subject matter of the legislation is precise
and accurate: the reforms at issue in the case are not of the entire healthcare or
even the entire health insurance system: instead, they are directed at the most
problematic part—the individual insurance market.190 Second, section I.A of
the opinion details what it terms the “long history of failed health insurance
reform,” citing the experience of failures in Washington and New York—which
enacted guaranteed issue and community rating requirements but no individual

184. Id.
185. Id. The dissent charges that the Court gives the phrase “established by the State” as having
no meaning at all. Id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. Id. While the dissent agrees that “the rule against treating a [statutory] term as a redundancy
is far from categorical,” it cites no less than Marbury v. Madison in support of the proposition that “the
rule against treating [a statutory term] as a nullity is as close to absolute as interpretive principles get.”
Id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
187. Id. at 2485–89.
188. Id. at 2485–86.
189. Id. at 2486 (citing Examining Individual State Experiences with Health Care Reform
Coverage Initiatives in the Context of National Reform: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ.,
Labor, and Pensions, 111th Cong. 9 (2009)). The Court cites this hearing for the fact that the
combination of the three interlocking reforms reduced the uninsured rate in Massachusetts to 2.6
percent. Id. This is a seemingly minor use of legislative history to support a background detail, but it
is worth noting that the point about interlocking reforms in Massachusetts is central to the Court’s
understanding of the ACA. (Interestingly, the Court cites page 9 of the transcript, but the document
makes reference to the uninsured rate in Massachusetts on page 8.)
190. This is clear from the first sentence of the opinion. See id. at 2492.
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mandates or subsidies—and the more successful program in Massachusetts—
which enacted the same three basic reforms as the ACA.191
Given that this is the starting point for the Court’s analysis, the ending
should come as no surprise. The final paragraphs of the opinion begin, perhaps
somewhat defensively, by reminding the reader that “[i]n a democracy, the
power to make the law rests with those chosen by the people,” and noting that
the judicial role is “more confined.”192 While claiming to “respect the role of
the Legislature,” the Court intones that “[a] fair reading of legislation demands
a fair understanding of the legislative plan.”193
However, as the very next sentence reveals, the words “legislative plan”
should not be read only to mean that the Court considers the structure of the act
when interpreting its provisions.194 Indeed, the next paragraph, worth quoting
in full, says:
Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health
insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we
must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the
former, and avoids the latter. Section 36B can fairly be read
consistent with what we see as Congress’s plan, and that is the
reading we adopt.195
The Court here candidly admits that its decision is rooted in the purpose of
the statute: “[T]o improve health insurance markets, not destroy them” and that
its interpretation “if at all possible” must be consistent with this purpose.196
And yet, an important issue remains. Does the holding of King v. Burwell
discard the text of the statute in reaching its admittedly purposivist result?
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion argues that the holding does no such thing,
finding ambiguity in the text and adopting a reading that the Court labors to
present as plausible.197 The dissent views the Court’s reading as ridiculous and

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 2485–86.
Id. at 2496.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2489, 2491.
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plainly contrary to the statutory text.198 To the dissenters, the Court has
wholesale discarded text in favor of purpose, à la Church of the Holy Trinity.199
The dissent criticizes two aspects of the majority’s reliance on purpose.200
First, the dissent says that the purpose identified by the Court does not come
from the text of the statute, which clearly makes tax credits unavailable on the
federal exchanges.201 Second, the dissent points out that involving states in the
administration of the statutory health insurance regime is also an important part
of the purpose of the Affordable Care Act.202 If premium support is not
available on the federal exchange, states have a greater incentive to set up their
own state exchanges203—an incentive which is no longer present once the Court
decides to make premium support available on the federal exchange.204
The consequences of these disputes are important. Whether one supports
the outcome or not, if one views this case as allowing purpose to trump text,
then the Court has indeed returned to old-style Church of the Holy Trinity
purposivism. If one instead views the case as one where the Court derived
purpose from a close reading of text and then used that purpose to animate a
textually plausible reading of an ambiguous provision, then this case falls into
some mild form of textually constrained purposivism, to return to John
Manning’s terms.205 Indeed, the opinion labors to put the case into the latter

198. Id. at 2502 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Statutory design and purpose matter only to the extent
they help clarify an otherwise ambiguous provision. Could anyone maintain with a straight face
that § 36B is unclear?”).
199. Id. Needless to say, the dissent finds this approach thoroughly illegitimate. Justice
Kavanaugh notes that the court seems to employ a type of “mistake canon” that does not allow recourse
to legislative history but that does permits courts to “adopt what they conclude Congress meant rather
than what Congress said.” Kavanaugh, supra note 3, at 2159 (reviewing KATZMANN, supra note 1).
Kavanaugh considers this type of mistake correction a “narrower form of Holy Trinity.” Id. In
response, Judge Katzmann argued that in King, the Court “showed that it was willing to depart from
what would otherwise be the most natural reading of a phrase when context and the structure of a
statute require it.” Robert Katzmann, Response to Judge Kavanaugh’s Review of Judging Statutes, 129
HARV. L. REV. F. 388, 394 (2016). Katzmann seeks to avoid the Holy Trinity comparison entirely,
declaring that “the interpretive exercise can be complicated, and is not usefully reduced to
characterizations of the Holy Trinity rubric as simplistically substituting a law’s spirit for clear text.”
Id.
200. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2502 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 2502–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 2504 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. See discussion supra Section I.B.
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category, or even into the category of purpose-sensitive textualism.206
However, these efforts are not compelling.
Instead, it is plain from reading the opinion that the Court ventured far
beyond statutory text in reaching its conclusions.207 Prudential reasoning—that
is, evaluating a decision in view of its likely consequences—is usually only
explicitly invoked in the context of constitutional interpretation.208 Indeed,
prudential reasoning in statutory interpretation cases risks collapsing judicial
interpretation into the legislative function: deciding the best outcome on policy
grounds, and setting a legal rule that encompasses that outcome, a result
generally thought undemocratic and undesirable when undertaken by a court.209
Yet, King v. Burwell seems a prime case for prudential reasoning. Two
major studies, one from the Urban Institute and the other from the Rand
Corporation had each concluded that eliminating subsidies on the federal
exchanges would result in approximately eight million citizens becoming
uninsured and premiums increasing by more than 35% in the nongroup
market.210 This research was before the Supreme Court, most clearly described

206. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
207. See id. at 2493–96.
208. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (noting that decisions to
overrule prior holdings are “customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations . . .”); Neil S. Siegel, Prudentialism in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 6 DUKE J. CONST.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 16, 21–25 (2011) (identifying forms of prudential reasoning by Justices Stevens,
Alito, and Scalia); see also PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
61 (1982); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 16–17 (1991).
209. This collapse would destroy any notion that the legislature is or ought to be supreme and
that the judge ought to be a “faithful agent” of the legislature, a widely held assumption across the
ideological spectrum. KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 29 (“I start with the premise that the role of the
courts is to interpret the law in a way that is faithful to its meaning. The role of the court is not to
substitute its judgment or to alter the terms of the statute.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 63 (1994) (“We [judges] are
supposed to be faithful agents, not independent principals.”). But see Richard A. Posner, Comment on
Professor Gluck’s “Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts”, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 11, 11–13 (2015)
(referring to “judicial deference to Congress” as a “pretense,” asserting that “most of the time statutory
interpretation is better described as creation or completion than as interpretation and that politics and
consequences are the major drivers of the outcome,” and stating bluntly that “judges prefer for reasons
of self-protection to be thought of as agents rather than as principals”).
210. LINDA J. BLUMBERG, MATTHEW BUETTGENS, & JOHN HOLAHAN, THE IMPLICATIONS OF
A SUPREME COURT FINDING FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN KING V. BURWELL: 8.2 MILLION MORE
UNINSURED
AND
35%
HIGHER
PREMIUMS
1
(2015),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/49246/2000062-The-Implications-King-vsBurwell.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PJM-CN7K] (finding that 8.2 million people would become uninsured
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in amicus briefs.211 The merits briefs acknowledged the consequences of
eliminating subsidies on the federal exchange as well, although it argued that
these disastrous consequences showed that the phrase “established by the State”
should not be read to defeat the purposes of the entire statute.212
Moreover, just five days before oral argument, Secretary of Health and
Human Services Sylvia Matthews Burwell sent a letter to key Congressional
leaders that spelled out that “a decision against the Administration in the King
case would cause massive damage” in the form of millions of people losing
insurance, rising premiums for those who remain insured in the individual
insurance market, and greater reliance on emergency room care by uninsured
individuals, driving up health insurance costs “for everyone.”213 Further,
repeating the phrase “massive damage” for the second time in two paragraphs,
Secretary Burwell stated that she knew of “no administrative actions that
could . . . undo the massive damage to our health care system that would be

in federal exchange states under the study’s assumptions and that average premiums in the nongroup
insurance market would increase by an estimated 35 percent); Evan Saltzman & Christine Eibner, The
Effect of Eliminating the Affordable Care Act’s Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated Marketplaces,
RAND CORP. (2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/health-quarterly/issues/v5/n1/07.html
[https://perma.cc/X9CA-ZNLD]; EVAN SALTZMAN & CHRISTINE EIBNER, THE EFFECT OF
ELIMINATING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S TAX CREDITS IN FEDERALLY FACILITATED
MARKETPLACES
2
(2015)
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR980/RAND_RR980.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N47F-4CQU] (finding that 8.0 million people become uninsured in federal exchange
states under the study’s assumptions and that unsubsidized premiums in the ACA-compliant individual
market would increase 47%).
211. See Brief for Bipartisan Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
16–24, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114) for a robust summary of the Urban
Institute and Rand studies mentioned below in note 210. Many other amicus briefs used this data as
the basis for examining the consequences within subsections of the US population. See, e.g., Brief of
Catholic Health Association of the United States and Catholic Charities USA as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114); Brief of American Cancer Society et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114). Amici supporting the
petitioner largely did not dispute the disruptive effects of eliminating subsidies on the federal exchange;
in their view, if the language of the statute created a problem, it was a problem for Congress and not
the Court to fix. See, e.g., Brief of Jonathan H. Adler and Michael F. Cannon as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 36–37, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).
212. Brief for the Respondents at 36–37, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114) (citing Urban
Institute and Rand Corporation studies as evidence of declines in enrollment and premium increases).
213. Letter from Sylvia Matthews Burwell to Senator Orrin G. Hatch (Feb. 24, 2015). A similar
letter was sent to the House, although I have only been able to locate online versions with the addressee
redacted.
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caused by an adverse decision.”214 The New York Times viewed the letter as
“put[ting] pressure on the [Supreme Court] to rule in favor of the
administration,” viewing the letter’s “implicit message” as telling the Court
“that the White House has no contingency plans” and that “if the court strikes
down subsidies, the justices will be responsible for causing hardship to lowerincome people and chaos in insurance markets around the country.”215
At oral arguments five days later, several Justices considered the
consequences of a ruling for the petitioners. At different points in the argument,
the basic factual picture painted by the Urban Institute and Rand Corp. research
was acknowledged by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito,
Sotomayor, and Kagan.216 A look at context of the Justices’ comments about
the consequences of the case reveals both that members of the Court were aware
of the consequences and that they struggled to find an appropriate way to take
account of the consequences within accepted principles of statutory
interpretation and related legal doctrine.217
For instance, Justices Sotomayor and Kennedy, in colloquy with counsel
for the petitioners, questioned whether states that chose to have the federal
government establish their exchanges and whose citizens were denied subsidies
on that federal exchange would be unconstitutionally coerced into setting up
their own exchange.218 Justice Kennedy suggested that the Court should

214. Id. It is notable that both uses of the phrase “massive damage” occur in the first sentence
of their respective paragraphs.
215. Robert Pear, Congress Is Told Administration Has No Remedy for a Ruling Against Health
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2015, at A15.
216. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 54–55, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114) (Scalia, J.)
(“If the consequences are as disastrous as you say, so many million people without—without insurance
and whatnot, yes, I think this Congress would act.”); id. at 16–17 (Kennedy, J.) (“[F]rom the standpoint
of the dynamics of Federalism, it does seem to me that there is something very powerful to the point
that if your argument is accepted, the States are being told either create your own Exchange, or we’ll
send your insurance market into a death spiral.”); id. at 20 (Ginsburg, J.) (“I have never seen anything
like this where [a state that allows the federal government to set up its Exchange] get[s] these disastrous
consequences.”); id. at 13 (Breyer, J.) (“[I]f you want to go into the context, at that point it seems to
me your argument really is weaker . . . The Exchanges fall apart, nobody can buy anything on them.”);
id. at 53 (Alito, J.) (pointing out that the Court has often stayed its mandate to avoid “disruptive
consequences” of a decision); Id. at 15 (Sotomayor, J.) (“In those States that don’t—their citizens don’t
receive subsidies, we’re going to have the death spiral that this system was created to avoid.”); id. at
34–35 (Kagan, J.) (“[U]nder your theory, if Federal Exchanges don’t qualify as Exchanges established
by the State, that means Federal Exchanges have no customers.”).
217. See infra notes 218–25 and accompanying text.
218. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 216, at 14–17 (Sotomayor, J.) (Kennedy, J.).
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interpret the statute to avoid what he called a “serious constitutional
question.”219 The constitutional objection does not seem strong. Indeed, in
NFIB v. Sebelius, the Court allowed states to opt out of the Affordable Care
Act’s expansion of Medicaid.220 The Court held that it would be coercive to
deny funding for the entire Medicaid program to a state that opted out, but the
Court explicitly permitted the federal government to withhold funding for the
expansion to states that opted out.221 This colloquy is better explained as an
attempt to wrestle with—and avoid if possible—the acknowledged disastrous
consequences of petitioners’ reading of the statute.
Even Justices Scalia and Alito, the two strongest proponents of a literal
reading of the statute, wrestled with the consequences of the statute.222 Justice
Scalia said, “If the consequences are as disastrous as you say . . . I think this
Congress would act.”223 Justice Alito suggested that the consequences of an
adverse ruling could be mitigated by “stay[ing] the mandate until the end of this
tax year” if the Court ruled subsidies unavailable on the federal Exchange.224
As one prominent commentator stated at the time, “There was nothing in those
remarks, by either of those two Justices, to indicate that they were questioning
whether the predictions of a serious social problem would, in fact, follow the
ruling against a nationwide subsidy system.”225
219. Id. at 18 (Kennedy, J.). Interestingly, when counsel for the petitioners pointed out that the
government had not advanced a constitutional argument, Justice Kennedy quipped, “Sometimes we
think of things the government doesn’t.” Id. at 17.
220. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012).
221. Id. Indeed, this point was made at oral argument, Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, King,
135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114), though Justice Kennedy did not seem convinced by it. Id. at 18
(Kennedy, J.).
222. See infra notes 223–25 and accompanying text.
223. Transcript of Oral Argument at 54–55, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114). It is interesting
to consider what Congress would and would not do. Both houses of Congress were under Republican
control at that point; numerous repeal votes were held, and in fact in January 2016, the Congress sent
a repeal bill to President Obama’s desk, which he promptly vetoed. Alex Moe, Congress Sends
Obamacare Repeal to President for First Time, NBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2016, 11:50 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/congress-send-obamacare-repeal-president-n491316
[https://perma.cc/2RX7-N6KC]. Indeed, as of this writing in 2018, with Republicans controlling both
houses of Congress and the White House, repeal has proven elusive. If the Court held subsidies
unavailable, it would perhaps have been easier to harm the Obamacare regime passively by refusing to
enact a “fix.” However, Republicans have as yet been unable to actively sabotage the law.
224. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114).
225. Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: Setting up the Private Debate on the ACA,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 4, 2015, 1:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/03/argument-analysissetting-up-the-private-debate-on-the-aca/ [https://perma.cc/W3VN-P56B].
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The opinion in the case itself grapples with consequences.226 By starting
with five pages detailing the history of health reform and the interdependence
of the guaranteed issue, community rating, and individual mandate, the opinion
not only describes the statutory scheme but demonstrates that the scheme falls
apart if the statute is interpreted in a way that eviscerates part of its reforms.227
Indeed, in refusing Chevron deference to the IRS ruling on the availability of
subsidies on the federal Exchange, the Court notes that the subsidies
“involve[e] billions of dollars in spending each year and affect[] the price of
health insurance for millions of people,” along the way to concluding that the
question is one of “deep economic and political significance.”228
Perhaps most strikingly, the Court cites both the Urban Institute and Rand
Corporation studies for the number of people who would be forced off health
insurance and the percentage of premium increase for the those who manage to
keep their insurance.229 The Court concludes that it is “implausible that
Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner.”230 This argument seems to
go to the intent of Congress, or to the statutory scheme. Further, it seems likely
that the Court also chose a reading of the statute designed to avoid a truly
disastrous consequence.
C. Conclusion
King v. Burwell presents a thorny interpretive problem. The language
“established by the State” seems clear, yet the structure and purpose of the act
(at least at a broad level of generality) raised a serious interpretive question.231
Further, other provisions of the Act appear not to make sense if the narrowest
linguistic meaning of the “established by the State” provision is followed.232
Thus, the Court reached a result designed to harmonize the provision at issue
with the structure and purpose of the Act.233 It is the clearest recent example of
a Supreme Court opinion relying on purpose, nearly to the contradiction of plain
text. For a court that has preached textualism for decades, the decision appears
226.
227.
228.
229.

King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493–94.
Id. at 2485–89.
Id. at 2489 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 2493–94 (citing SALTZMAN & EIBNER, supra note 210; BLUMBERG, BUETTGENS, &
HOLAHAN, supra note 210).
230. Id. at 2494.
231. See Katzmann, supra note 199, at 394.
232. Id.
233. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490–96.
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out of step. While it is tempting to view it as one-off, the decision in King is
best seen as a pragmatic choice to reach what appears to be a correct result that
does the least violence to a statutory scheme in a very difficult case.
IV. KING V. BURWELL AS RECEIVED BY THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
In the two years following its issue, some seventy-two federal courts of
appeals decisions have cited King v. Burwell.234 While a small number of these
decisions relate to the law of the Affordable Care Act or to administrative law
topics, the vast majority deal with the proper reading of a the federal statutes at
issue.235 This group of cases reflects the diverse approaches one would expect
from American statutory interpretation jurisprudence: courts generally rely on
text as the starting point, looking to context, statutory structure and scheme,
legislative purpose, and legislative history in varying proportions depending on
the clarity of the evidence and the predilections of the judges on the panel.236
Three major trends involving King arise from the cases. First, there is a
group of cases that uses scheme and purpose as in King to give effect to text
that is unclear, to broaden the meaning of seemingly clear text, and even, upon
occasion, to trump the meaning of seemingly clear text.237 Second, at the other
end of the spectrum, there is a small group of cases that reject King’s reliance
on scheme and purpose to trump or even illuminate the meaning of statutory
text.238 Some of these cases engage in philosophical and jurisprudential
jousting, but at little cost: it’s easy to affirm textualist principles in the context
of a case easily resolved by text.239 The remainder of cases, which are the vast
majority, pose little conflict between text and purpose: they use context,
scheme, and purpose to reinforce a semantically plausible reading of the text.240
While King is not the harbinger of a new day in statutory interpretation, it
demonstrates beyond dispute that text and purpose remain the central tools of
American statutory interpretation.241 In legal process terms, courts that (tell
themselves they) hew most closely to text and reject King’s model of context,
scheme and purpose as interpretive guides are those that distinguish most
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See infra notes 246–47 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 249–50 and accompanying text.
See infra Sections IV.B–D.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
See infra Section IV.C.
See infra Section IV.D.
See infra Section IV.D.
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sharply between the roles of courts and the roles of legislatures in giving effect
to statutes.242 Those that engage in King-like reasoning view courts as
complementary partners to legislatures in making meaning of the words in
statutes.243
A. A Note About Method
This Article considers all federal court of appeals cases citing King issued
within a two-year period after the Supreme Court announced its decision.244
Selecting this time period has advantages. First, it is a sufficient period for
litigants and courts to absorb the King decision and to consider its application
in a wide variety of legal contexts, as will be clear from the discussion below.
Second, none of these cases have pending certiorari petitions to the Supreme
Court.245 Thus each of these cases has by now made its complete contribution
to the law.
Cases were identified through the “Citing References” feature on Westlaw
and the Shepard’s feature on Lexis Advance.246 This identified seventy-two
unique cases.247 Each case was then analyzed for the purpose of determining
242. See infra Section IV.C.
243. See infra Section IV.B.
244. As will be clear from the discussion below, this Article does not attempt quantitative
analysis of the decisions. While it would be possible to code the decisions in various ways and perform
statistical analyses on them, a qualitative approach to the cases facilitates a more nuanced
understanding of the interpretive moves courts are making. For an interesting discussion of the merits
of quantitative vs. qualitative approaches to sets of cases, see Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy
Policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract Law, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 45, 45, 96, 101 (2019)
(claiming that results of certain quantitative studies used in the Restatement of Consumer Contract
Law cannot be replicated and arguing that qualitative study of the cases reveals a more accurate picture
of the law).
245. Indeed, the last cert petition, relating to In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig.,
818 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 2050 (2019), was dismissed while this Article
was in production.
246. See WESTLAW, www.westlaw.com; LEXIS, www.lexisnexis.com. I consulted these
websites a final time and saved to my computer the list of citing references from both sources on June
15, 2018.
247. Interestingly, four cases were identified by Lexis that were not identified by Westlaw.
These cases are Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 2016); Assocs. Against
Outlier Fraud v. Huron Consulting Grp., Inc., 817 F.3d 433 (2d Cir. 2016); Knox Creek Coal Corp. v.
Sec’y of Labor, 811 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 2016); and United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir.
2015). I have excluded Knox Creek Coal from the set and do not count it among the seventy-two
because the opinion in that case cites the Fourth Circuit and not the Supreme Court opinion in King v.
Burwell. 811 F.3d at 158 (citing King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2014) for the proposition
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why King v. Burwell was cited and what interpretive moves the courts made.
From there, the cases were divided into the groups identified in the introduction
to this Section.
Seventeen of the seventy-two cases do not pertain primarily to statutory
interpretation and are not considered in the Sections that follow. These
seventeen cases fall into three groups. The first is a group of five cases that cite
King v. Burwell for its description of the Affordable Care Act and do not cite
King for statutory interpretation principles.248 The six cases in the second group
concern themselves with the major questions doctrine, that is the language in
King that states that the Court should not defer to an administrative agency on
a question of “deep economic and political significance that is central to [the]
statutory scheme.”249 Each of these cases considers whether the matter is at
issue is a major question.250 Finally, the six cases in the third group merely cite

that the language of a statute is ambiguous if it is subject to multiple interpretations). Digital research,
while facilitating efficient manipulation of large data sets, is not yet perfect.
248. These cases are Ohio v. United States, 849 F.3d 313, 315–16 (6th Cir. 2017) (rejecting
challenge by the State of Ohio, its political subdivisions and four public universities against the
Transitional Reinsurance Program of the ACA; citing King for general description of the ACA’s
purposes and requirements); Ohio State Chiropractic Ass’n v. Humana Health Plan Inc., 647 Fed.
Appx. 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2016) (rejecting removal of case against Medicare Advantage organization
to federal court on the grounds that the MAO does not act under a federal agency; citing King for
background principles on the functioning of insurance markets); Eternal Word Television Network,
Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1175–76 n.16 (11th Cir. 2016)
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (rejecting RFRA and First Amendment challenge to regulations implementing
ACA mandate to provide contraceptive coverage as part of group health insurance plans; Judge Tjoflat,
in dissent, cites King for the proposition that the ACA contemplates each state setting up its own health
insurance exchange); Cutler vs. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 797 F.3d 1173, 1175–76 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to ACA and finding no standing to pursue
equal protection claims against certain ACA policies; citing King for background on the structure of
health insurance markets and for a description of the three interlocking reforms mandated by the ACA);
Sissel v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 799 F.3d 1035, 1035, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Rogers,
Pillard, and Wilkins, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (denying rehearing en banc to
Origination Clause challenge to ACA; citing King v. Burwell for background on the ACA’s three
interlocking reforms).
249. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
250. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 402–03 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (challenge to net neutrality rules); Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch,
818 F.3d 808, 825–26 (9th Cir. 2016) (Seabright, J., dissenting) (arguing that a provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act does not present a major question and thus the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference); Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019,
1031–32 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that a provision
of the Immigration and Nationality Act with both civil and criminal consequences should not be given
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King for a canon of construction,251 for a very basic principle of statutory
interpretation,252 or for Justice Scalia’s memorable barb terming reasoning he
disagreed with “interpretive jiggery-pokery.”253
Assigning the fifty-six remaining cases to categories proved complicated.
As has often been noted, text that is crystal-clear to one reader is ambiguous to
another.254 And courts are not above manipulating text to find ambiguity.255 To
sidestep the inevitable difficulties of attempting to second-guess the courts’

Chevron deference; citing the major questions doctrine as described in King as an example of a
categorical exception to Chevron); ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 810 F.3d 1283, 1302–03 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (arguing that Chevron deference is not appropriate under the
major questions doctrine to International Trade Commission’s claim of jurisdiction over “all incoming
international Internet data transmissions”); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 181 n.179 (5th Cir.
2015) (arguing that Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
program (DAPA) presents a major question inappropriate for administrative action); id. at 218 (King,
J., dissenting) (arguing that DHS is the appropriate agency to administer immigration matters); FTC v.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 253 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting Wyndham’s argument that the
FTC’s regulatory actions in the cyber security area involved major questions); Suprema v. ITC, 796
F.3d 1338, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (arguing that a provision of the Tariff Act
of 1930 is clear, and thus the International Trade Commission’s interpretation is not entitled to
deference; citing King for the proposition that the Supreme Court has indicated that courts “should not
nonchalantly defer to an agency’s interpretation for questions of ‘deep economic and political
significance’”).
251. Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 467 (5th Cir. 2016) (Jones, J.,
dissenting) (quoting King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495) (“Congress does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes”);
Castañeda v. Souza, 810 F.3d 15, 53 (1st Cir. 2015) (Kayatta, J., joining) (surplusage canon not
absolute); BancInsure, Inc. v. FDIC, 796 F.3d 1226, 1239 (10th Cir. 2015) (surplusage canon not
absolute).
252. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en
banc granted, opinion vacated, Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 962 (11th Cir.
2016) (“If the statutory language is clear, then our inquiry ends.”). PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin.
Protection Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (en banc) similarly cited King for the general proposition that “[i]n a democracy, the power to
make the law rests with those chosen by the people.” Id. The citation is offered in support of the
panel’s holding that CFPB, as an agency, was not free to rule on a legal question in the absence of
statutory authority. Id.
253. McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1095 (11th Cir. 2017).
254. Molot, supra note 69, at 39–40; Kavanaugh, supra note 3, at 2159 (calling the ambiguity
issue “indeterminate”).
255. But see Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REV. 523, 523 (2018)
(arguing that courts’ tendency to see language as ambiguous in high-stakes cases is not a function of
court’s desire to reach particular results on instrumentalist grounds but is instead a rational reaction
when stakes are heightened; put differently, courts are justifiably more cautious about the meaning of
text as an epistemic matter when the consequences of their decisions are heightened).
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conclusions, this article accepts the courts’ characterizations of the language
they are interpreting. If the court claims ambiguity in the statute, this analysis
examines which tools the court uses to find ambiguity: whether linguistic and
semantic, or contextual and purposive. At times, divided panels of the appeals
courts have disagreed about whether text is clear or ambiguous.256 In those
instances, this article presents those disagreements in the discussions below
(often in the footnotes). To be sure, the choice not to devote substantial space
to independent analysis of whether the courts accurately characterize the
language of cases risks missing a few instances where courts may be mistaken
or disingenuous. However, cases in that category did not seem particularly
common; more often, these issues were made plain through majority and
dissenting opinions.257
B. Cases that Embrace a Purposive Reading of Text
Sixteen cases plus three dissents use King v. Burwell to support a reading
of text that relies in a substantial way on the court’s view of the statutory
scheme or purposes.258 At least three variations of this maneuver may be
identified. First, some cases take a step that is substantially similar to what the
Supreme Court did in King: they find that some combination of context,
scheme, and purpose creates ambiguity where the text read in isolation seems
facially clear.259 Second, some cases use subsequent legislative developments
to inform the meaning of prior legislative enactments.260 Third, and finally,

256. See, e.g., Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2016)
(Martin, J., dissenting); Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 157 (2d Cir. 2015).
257. For instance, consider Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control, Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1325–28 (11th
Cir. 2016), in which a divided panel holds that a statute providing rights to reentering veterans in the
employment context does not require invalidation of an arbitration clause. Both the majority, id. at
1327, and the dissenting judge, id. at 1329–32, claim that text, context, and purpose support their
respective readings of the statute. I have not attempted to arbitrate which side is correct in such cases;
rather, both are unremarkable for purposes of understanding the application of King because the case
does not present a conflict between text and purpose in any form. Instead, it seems to me, the case is
best understood as one in which language and context are flexible enough to be read in different ways,
and the majority and dissent would decide the case based mostly upon different visions of legislative
priority and meaning.
258. See infra Sections IV.B.1–3.
259. See infra Section IV.B.1.
260. See infra Section IV.B.2.
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some cases use context, scheme, and/or purpose to illuminate the meaning of
text that is unclear or ambiguous.261
1. Cases in Which Context, Scheme, and Purpose Appear to Override Text
The five cases described in this Section embody the strongest form of
purposive interpretation of any cases in this set. All of them consider statutory
purpose, using in turn, the scheme and structure of the Act, statutory
declarations of purpose, and (in four cases) legislative history.262 Each of these
cases claims to respect Congress’ intent in enacting the statute at issue.263
Perhaps the clearest, though certainly not the only, instance of a court
departing from the apparent plain meaning of a statutory term occurs in OwnerOperator Independent Drivers Association. v. United States Department of
Transportation.264 In this case, the Seventh Circuit considered pragmatic
consequences, statutory purpose, scheme, and legislative history in upholding
Department of Transportation rules that, in part, mandate electronic logging
devices (ELD) in most interstate commercial motor vehicles.265
The plaintiffs, a trade organization, challenged the rule on the grounds that
it did not fulfill the statutory command that ELDs be “capable of recording a
driver’s hours of service and duty status accurately and automatically.”266
Petitioners argued that the term “automatically” requires a device that is
“entirely automatic; no human involvement is permitted.”267 The court rejected
261. See infra Section IV.B.3.
262. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2016), affirmed, 138 S.
Ct. 816 (2018); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 840 F.3d 879 (7th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2246 (2017); In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d
98, 105 (2d Cir. 2016) cert. dismissed, 139 S. Ct. 2050 (2019); In re Trump Entm’t Resorts, 810 F.3d
161, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2016); G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist., 802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015). Denials
of certiorari will be noted for all cases discussed in this Section because they are “particularly relevant.”
See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 10.7 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n,
Harvard Law Review Ass’n, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and Yale Law Journal eds., 20th
ed. 2015).
263. Owner-Operator Indep., 840 F.3d at 888; In re Tribune, 818 F.3d at 120; In re Trump
Entm’t Resorts, 810 F.3d at 171; Rubin, 830 F.3d at 483; Ligonier Valley, 802 F.3d at 616–17.
264. 840 F.3d 879.
265. Id. at 883. The long history of Congress’ attempts to get the agency to issue a rule requiring
electronic monitoring devices on long-haul trucks, the agency’s responses, and various rebukes of the
agency by the D.C. and Seventh Circuits is recounted in the background section of the opinion. See
id. at 885–87.
266. Id. at 887 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31137(f)(1)(A)).
267. Id. (emphasis in original).
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this interpretation of the term, first penning two paragraphs making the
pragmatic and prudential argument that devices that require no human
interaction whatever are not feasible and are undesirable.268 Further, and most
relevant here, the court termed itself “confident that Congress did not intend”
the word “automatically” to entirely preclude human interaction with ELDs.269
The court cited King for the proposition that it should “construe statutes, not
isolated provisions” and proceeded to consider “other parts of the statute”
which provide “context” that undermined plaintiffs’ reading of the term
“automatic.”270 For instance, the statute directs that the agency ensure that
ELDs will not be used to harass drivers and consider ELD’s implications for
drivers’ privacy.271 From these provisions, the court concluded that Congress
meant for the agency to “balance competing goals” of accuracy and privacy
when deciding which ELDs the rules would permit.272 Finally, the court
deployed two additional arguments: that the Congressional language came from
a vacated prior version of the agency rule that defined “automatically” as
meaning something less than entirely automatic, and that if Congress had
intended to change the meaning of “automatic” between the prior, vacated
agency rule and the current statute, it would have done so explicitly, without
“hid[ing] elephants in mouseholes.”273
These arguments are sensible, and square with the long dialogue between
Congress, the courts, and the agency about how best to regulate long-distance
truck drivers and how to avoid fraud in paper driver logs.274 However, it is
notable that they stretch the meaning of the word “automatically” to include
functions that must be performed by the driver, for example, recording changes
of status from “off-duty” to “on-duty, not driving.”275 This expansion of
meaning, and the concomitant blessing of agency rules reflecting the expansion,

268. Id. at 887–88 (noting the difficulty, for example, of a fully automatic device that would
“record a driver’s change from ‘off duty’ to ‘on-duty, not driving,’” and rejecting constant video
surveillance and bio-monitoring devices as “breathtakingly invasive”).
269. Id.
270. Id. (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015)).
271. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31137(a)(2), (d)(2)).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 888–89.
274. See id.
275. Id. at 888. It is worth noting that the opinion cites King a second time for the unremarkable
proposition that ambiguity in a statutory term implies a delegation to the relevant agency to “fill in the
statutory gaps.” Id. at 889–90 (citing King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488).
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is based on the court’s view of statutory purpose buttressed by statutory
scheme.276
The Second Circuit made a similar move in the course of construing a safe
harbor provision of the Bankruptcy Code in In re Tribune Company Fraudulent
Conveyance Litigation.277 Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, in general
terms, permits a Chapter 11 trustee in bankruptcy to recover certain funds
transferred to other parties by the debtor before filing bankruptcy.278 This
powerful avoidance power is limited by § 546(e), which provides a safe harbor,
preventing a trustee from avoiding certain securities-related payments made to
defined participants in the financial markets.279 The payments at issue include
margin payments, settlement payments or transfers in connection with a
securities contract, commodity contract, or forward contract; the protected
entities consist largely of financial institutions.280 Section 546(e) provides a
federal cause of action for avoidance of these payments only when there is
intentional fraud, i.e. when the payments are made with “actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud” creditors, but it provides no federal cause of action for
constructive fraud.281
Noting that § 546(e) by its terms applies only to claims brought by the
bankruptcy trustee, creditors in the Tribune bankruptcy claimed a power to
bring state law constructive fraud claims (i.e. non-intentional fraud claims)
notwithstanding the limits of § 546(e) (and other sections of the bankruptcy
code).282 The Second Circuit rejected this claim, finding that § 546(e)
276. Id. at 887–88.
277. 818 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2016).
278. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012).
279. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012).
280. Id.
281. 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(e), 548(a)(1)(A) (2012).
282. In re Tribune Co., 818 F.3d at 105 (Creditors argued that they were not barred by the
automatic stay or by § 546(e)). For the sake of simplicity, this discussion avoids an important
complexity here. There is a question whether the creditors’ state law constructive fraud claims survive
the automatic stay provision. Id. at 105. Creditors argue that the claims are prevented during the stay
but revert back to the creditors after the stay is completed. Id. at 114. This question turns on the
“debated and somewhat metaphysical” question about who owns the claims. Id. at 116. The claims
belong either to the creditors or to the debtor’s estate. Either way, the trustee has power to bring the
claims within the allowed period. Id. at 106–07. If they remain property of the creditors, it seems
possible that they can revert back after the stay expires or is lifted. Id. at 114. If the claims become
property of the debtor’s estate, the notion that they revert back to the creditors after the expiration or
lifting of the stay seems “counterintuitive” to the court because the trustee is empowered to make
decisions about which claims to bring. Id. at 117. Because this issue is unsettled and was unsettled at
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preempted such power in the hands of creditors as well as trustees.283 In
reaching this holding, the court looked to “language, legislative history, and
purposes.”284 The court noted that the purpose of § 546(e) is to provide
certainty as to completed securities transactions, speed to allow parties to adjust
to market conditions, finality as to investors’ stakes in firms, and stability of
financial markets.285 The court held that allowing creditors to bring claims that
were forbidden to the trustee undermined these statutory purposes.286 Citing
King, the court warned against “putting lynchpin reliance on the word ‘trustee’”
and emphasized the importance of considering context and statutory scheme.287
Thus, the court found that creditors were also prohibited by § 546(e) from
asserting the claims described in the section.288 This move looks a great deal
like applying “established by the State” to the federal exchange—precisely
what the Supreme Court did in King.
The Third Circuit interpreted another provision of Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy code in a primarily contextual manner in In re Trump
Entertainment Resorts, and in fact admitted that it was not interpreting the code
provision at issue in “the most natural reading.”289 This bankruptcy, filed on
the time § 546(e) was added to the Code, the meaning of § 546(e) with respect to state law constructive
fraud claims is ambiguous. Id. at 118–19.
283. Id. at 124.
284. Id. at 118–19.
285. Id. at 119.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 120 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015)). As noted above, supra
note 280, further appellate review is not exhausted in this case. Creditors sought certiorari on
September 9, 2016. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. et. al. v. Robert R. McCormick Found. et. al., No.
16-317 (U.S. Sept. 9, 2016). On April 3, 2018, Justices Kennedy and Thomas issued a statement
deferring the disposition of the petition “for an additional period of time” to allow the lower courts to
consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138
S. Ct. 883 (2018), and specifically noting that the lower courts “could decide whether relief from
judgment is appropriate given the possibility that there might not be a quorum” at the Supreme Court
to decide the case. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. et. al. v. Robert R. McCormick Found. et. al., 138
S. Ct. 1162, 1163 (2018) (Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., statement respecting the petition for certiorari).
In Merit Management, the Court unanimously held that that § 546(e) permitted avoidance of transfers
to financial institutions where the covered financial entities are merely intermediaries and not the real
party in interest. 138 S. Ct. at 888. The Court did not consider the question of who is empowered to
bring such claims. The Second Circuit has not yet ruled on how it would apply the Merit Management
decision to this case.
288. In re Tribune Co., 818 F.3d at 124.
289. In re Trump Entm’t Resorts, 810 F.3d 161, 169 n.32 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing King, 135 S. Ct.
at 2489).
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September 9, 2014, involved the Trump Taj Mahal casino in Atlantic City, New
Jersey.290 Following the filing, the debtor sought to reject an expired collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with a labor union under the provisions of 11
U.S.C. § 1113.291 Section 1113 permits a debtor to “reject a collective
bargaining agreement” after the bankruptcy court agrees that certain procedural
and substantive conditions have been met; it further forbids debtors from
“terminat[ing] or alter[ing] any provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement” without meeting its terms.292 The statute does not say whether it
applies to expired CBAs or to the obligations imposed on an employer to
maintain the status quo following expiration under the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).293 The labor union claimed that the provisions of § 1113 do not
apply to expired CBAs and that the debtor could only avoid its status quo
obligations by following the stricter procedures of the NLRA.294
In considering whether § 1113 applies to expired CBAs, the Third Circuit
refused “to embark, as the parties [did], on a hyper-technical parsing of the
words and phrases” of the provision, or to “focus on a meaning that may seem
plain when considered in isolation.”295 In a footnote, the court quoted King v.
Burwell’s statement that “[i]n this instance, the context and structure of the
[statute] compel us to depart from what would otherwise be the most natural
reading of the pertinent statutory phrase.”296
Following this path, based on “the situation in which § 1113 was enacted”
and an “examin[ation] of the provision in the context of the Bankruptcy Code
as a whole,” the court held § 1113 allows a debtor to reject the continuing
obligations imposed by an expired CBA.297 The Third Circuit noted that § 1113
was enacted to overturn a Supreme Court decision that held that CBAs were
rendered unenforceable when a debtor filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.298
290. Id. at 164–65.
291. Id. at 163. As the Third Circuit noted, the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), prevents an employer from altering the status quo with respect to “mandatory
subjects of bargaining” even after a CBA expires. Id. at 168.
292. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2012).
293. Id.
294. In re Trump Entm’t Resorts, 810 F.3d. at 164.
295. Id. at 169.
296. Id. at 169 n.32.
297. Id. at 169, 173. The court cited King for the proposition that a phrase which may seem plain
in isolation may be ambiguous in context. Id. at 167, n.22.
298. Id. at 169–70 (noting that § 1113 was enacted to overturn the second holding in NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984)).
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In response to that decision, Congress imposed the procedural and substantive
safeguards of § 1113, to ensure that “when the NLRA yields to the Bankruptcy
Code, it does so only for reasons that will permit the debtor to stay in
business.”299 The court then embarked on a review of evidence in the case
demonstrating that the debtor needed to avoid its CBA obligations in order to
stay in business.300 The court further argued that its holding was “consistent
with the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code which gives debtors latitude to
restructure their affairs,” citing King’s admonition that “[w]e cannot interpret
federal statutes to negate their own stated purposes.”301
This brief case is remarkable. The Third Circuit explicitly admits that it is
not following the “most natural reading” of the phrase “collective bargaining
agreement” in holding that it includes continuing obligations imposed by the
NLRA after a collective bargaining agreement expires.302 Congress could
easily have used the term “collective bargaining obligations” if it wished to
specify something broader than the contractual agreement between the parties.
The result is a purposive interpretation that is in significant tension with text.
In Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Seventh Circuit used context and
purpose, though not legislative history, to narrow the reach of a provision of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA).303 The case grew out of an attempt
by U.S. citizens injured in a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem to execute
on a $71.5 million dollar default judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran
that they obtained in 1997.304 The plaintiffs’ attempts at executing on this
judgment sprawl across two decades, across the country, and across the pages
of federal case reporters.305
In its 2016 decision, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the plaintiffs
could execute against Persian antiquities that belong to Iran but were in the
possession of two Chicago institutions: the University of Chicago and the Field
Museum of Natural History.306 One of the plaintiffs’ arguments was that the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) permits execution on a foreign state’s
299. Id. at 171.
300. Id. at 171–72.
301. Id. at 173–74 n.60 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492–93 (2015)).
302. Id. at 168–69 n.32.
303. 830 F.3d 470, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2016), affirmed, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018).
304. Id. at 473.
305. For a mere snippet, see id. at 473. The subsequent appellate history on Lexis contains
eighty-four items as of October 20, 2019.
306. Id.
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property that is “used for a commercial activity in the United States.”307 The
Seventh Circuit admitted that the statute does not, by its terms, require that the
foreign sovereign itself put the assets to commercial use.308 Nonetheless, it read
this statutory provision to “require commercial use by the foreign state itself,
not a third party.”309 Based on this view of the statutory rule, the court easily
concluded that Iran did not itself engage in commercial use and the assets
should be shielded from judgments.310
In reaching its holding, the court relied on the holdings of three other
circuits and made a King-type context argument to narrow the reach of the
provision.311 The Rubin court also relied on the declaration of purpose codified
in the statute itself; this declaration refers to the international law norm that
“states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their
commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property may be
levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in
connection with their commercial activities.”312 The Rubin court read this
language as an instruction that execution immunity exists only where the
foreign state itself has used its property for commercial purposes.313
As if these examples are not clear enough, perhaps a clearer instance of a
court setting aside the textual meaning of the statute for a contextual solution is
found in the Third Circuit’s decision in G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School
District.314 This case involved a child’s claim for compensatory education
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).315 The court

307. Id. The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on this issue and therefore did not consider
it in its review. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017) (granting certiorari only as
to one question presented by the petition); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (No. 16-534). The issue described in the text did not create a circuit split, Rubin,
830 F.3d at 481. The Court noted that it was granting cert. on a different issue “to resolve a split among
the Courts of Appeals.” Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 821.
308. Rubin, 830 F.3d at 479 (observing that “[t]he passive voice focuses on an event that occurs
without respect to a specific actor”) (citing Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009)).
309. Id. at 473.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 479–80 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) for the proposition that
the meaning or ambiguity of certain words or phrases only becomes apparent when they are placed in
context and examining a provision that extends jurisdictional immunity).
312. Id. at 479 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1602).
313. Id.
314. 802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015).
315. Id. at 604.
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confronted an apparent conflict between two limitations provisions.316 The
first, a statute of limitations found at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C), provides that a
due process complaint under the statute must be filed by the parents “no more
than two years after the parents ‘knew or should have known’ about the alleged
deprivation.”317 In other words, a complaint must be filed within two years of
the discovery of the deprivation.318 The second, a prefatory provision found at
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B), describes a due process complaint as alleging “an
injury that occurred not more than two years before the reasonable discovery
date.”319 The court sketched out four ways this second provision could impact
the first:
Does § 1415(b)(6)(B) limit compensatory education to injuries
occurring two years before the filing of the complaint, even if
earlier injuries are claimed within two years of their reasonable
discovery, as urged by Appellant Ligonier Valley School
District Authority? Does it limit compensatory education to
injuries that occurred from two years before their reasonable
discovery through the filing of the complaint, up to two years
after that discovery, i.e., the “2+2” approach taken by the
District Court and urged by [the plaintiff]? Does it impose only
a pleading requirement, without affecting the availability of a
remedy for timely and well-pleaded claims, as argued by
Amici Appellees and [the plaintiff] in the alternative? Or is it
simply a restatement, albeit ill-phrased, of the same two-year
statute of limitations set forth in § 1415(f)(3)(C), as asserted by
the United States Department of Education (“DOE”)?320
The court concluded that § 1415(b)(6)(B) was merely an inartful
restatement of the two-year statute of limitations found in § 1415(f)(3)(C).321
In reaching this conclusion, the court considered plain language arguments, the
broader context of the statute, the views of the U.S. Department of Education,
and the legislative history of the provisions at issue.322 The court cited King for
the proposition that the “words of a statute must be read in their context and

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id.
Id. (emphasis in original) (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C)).
Id. (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C)).
Id. (emphasis in original) (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B)).
Id.
Id. at 604–05.
Id. at 611–12.
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with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”323 Upon lengthy
analysis of each of these sources, the court concluded that this was a “rare case[]
[in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably
at odds with the intention of its drafters.”324 The court said that IDEA “needs
common sense revision,” but then proceeded to interpret the provision in a way
that the court believed effected that revision and gave effect to the court’s
perception of Congress’ intent.325
2. Cases Where Future Legislative Enactments Change the Meaning of Text
In two cases, courts treat the meaning of text as subject to change in view
of future legislative enactments.326 These cases are important because they
subordinate text to a larger view of Congressional purpose—indeed, a purpose
not even noted in the original legislative enactment.327
In an important case involving the National Security Agency’s bulk
telephone metadata collection program, the Court considered the effect of the
USA FREEDOM Act (“Freedom Act”) on statutory language that appeared to
remain unchanged.328 The NSA relied on the authority of § 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act (“Patriot Act”), enacted in the shadow of the September 11th
attacks, in undertaking bulk collection of telephone metadata involving calls
made by and to citizens of the United States.329 On May 7, 2015, the Second
Circuit held that the NSA’s bulk collection program exceeded the authority
of § 215.330
Less than one month later, on June 1, 2015, the Patriot Act expired.331 The
very next day, June 2, 2015, Congress enacted the Freedom Act.332 The
Freedom Act amended § 215 to make clear that it did not authorize bulk
323. Id. at 611 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015)).
324. Id. at 624 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
325. Id. at 625–26.
326. ACLU v. Clapper, 804 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2015); Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.3d 721 (2d Cir.
2015).
327. Clapper, 804 F.3d at 624; Mantena, 809 F.3d at 734–36.
328. Clapper, 804 F.3d at 622–23. Telephone metadata “does not include the contents of a
telephone call, but rather the details about the call, such as the length of the call, the phone number
from which the call was made, and the phone number at which the call was received—information
sometimes referred to as call detail records.” Id. at 619.
329. Id. at 618–19.
330. Id. at 620.
331. Id.
332. Id.
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collection programs; however, it also contained a provision in § 109 that
delayed the effectiveness of these amendments for 180 days and provided that
“[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to alter or eliminate the authority of
the Government to obtain an order under [§ 215] as in effect prior [to the
effective date of the amendment].”333 Having found that § 215 did not
authorize the program, the Second Circuit considered whether it would allow
the program to continue during the 180-day transition period.334
The court decided that the program was authorized during the transition,
despite the lack of explicit language from Congress saying so.335 Even though
the language of § 215 was not changed, the court said that the statutory context
changed, citing King v. Burwell for the proposition that § 215 had to be
considered in the context of the subsequent Freedom Act amendments.336
Though it previously held that § 215 did not authorize the program, the court
concluded that its holding must give way to Congress’ intent in enacting the
Freedom Act that the program continue during the 180-day transition.337
Interestingly, the court was transparent in its readings of Congress’ intentions:
the court admitted that “the present Congress cannot tell us what the Congress
that passed the Patriot Act intended to authorize,” but nonetheless found
Congress’ intent in passing the Freedom Act to be “clear.”338 The language
of § 215 did not change, but its meaning and interpretation was changed by a
subsequent enactment.339
A second case from the Second Circuit made a similar move involving
regulatory text. In Mantena v. Johnson, the court considered an immigration
regulation that required notice to a skilled foreign worker’s employer (the
“petitioner”) when the government denies the employer’s I-140 “Immigrant
Petition for Alien Worker,” a necessary step en route to permanent residency
(i.e. a “green card”).340 The regulation requires notice to the “petitioner,”

333. Id.
334. Id. at 622.
335. Id. at 623.
336. Id. at 624 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015)) (“That Congress did not
change the language of § 215 must be viewed in the context of the larger changes to the statute.”).
337. Id. at 626.
338. Id. at 623.
339. Id. at 624.
340. Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.3d 721, 723, 733 (2d Cir. 2015). The regulation at issue may
be found at 8 C.F.R. § 205.2. Id. at 733. As preliminary matters, the court determined that a procedural
challenge to the notice provision did not fall within the Immigration and Naturalization Act’s
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however, subsequent to the enactment of the regulation, a statute was enacted
that provided that immigration-related applications, including the I-140, would
be portable when the immigrant changed jobs.341 In litigating the matter at the
Second Circuit, the government took the position that the regulation did not
change textually, and for that reason, the original employer is the only party
who needs to be notified of the government’s decision to deny an I-140
petition.342 However, the court held that the government acted inconsistently
with the context of the “portability provisions” by failing to provide notice to
either the successor employer as adopter of the petition or to the immigrant as
the petition’s beneficiary.343 While regulations are perhaps under greater
pressure to harmonize with a subsequent statutory amendment than are statutes,
this case provides an example of a post-enactment statutory change altering the
meaning and effect of a regulation.344
3. Purpose Used to Decide Among Permissible Readings of Statutory
Language
In nine cases and three dissents, the courts have relied on purposive
readings where statutory language is unclear, silent, or interpreted differently
by various courts.345 These courts typically cite King’s admonition to consider
context and statutory scheme.346
In United States v. Epskamp, the defendant was convicted of possession
with intent to distribute a controlled substance on an aircraft registered in the

jurisdiction-stripping provisions, id. at 728–30, and that the immigrant had standing to raise the
procedural challenge that notice to the employer was insufficient, id. at 730–33.
341. Id. at 733–34.
342. Id. at 735.
343. Id. at 736.
344. To be clear, the court did nothing more than hold that the agency acted inconsistently with
the statutory scheme. It remanded on the “precise way to read the notice regulations” for further
development in the District Court and at the agency. Id. at 736.
345. In one additional case, a court relied primarily on a textual reading of statutory scheme to
reject a narrow reliance on a single provision. In National Mining Association v. Secretary, United
States Department of Labor, the Eleventh Circuit considered a provision that appeared to require the
Secretaries of Labor and Health and Human Services to jointly promulgate certain mine safety
regulations. 812 F.3d 843, 863 (11th Cir. 2016). However, the court did not agree that joint
promulgation was required under the circumstances of the case, finding that such an interpretation
“misconstrues the statutory scheme.” Id. at 864.
346. See, e.g., United States v. Epskamp, 832 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2016); Hernandez v. Williams,
829 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2016).

CEDRONE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

12/3/2019 7:50 PM

SUPREME SILENCE AND PRECEDENTIAL PRAGMATISM

93

United States.347 Because the aircraft flew from the Dominican Republic to
Antwerp, Belgium, the court needed to consider whether the statute had
extraterritorial effect.348 Notwithstanding the statute’s “less than crystalline
drafting,” the court determined that it could “discern[] its meaning, particularly
with the aid of broader statutory context.”349 The defendant based his primary
argument on a sentence in the venue provision of the statute that provided that
the “section is intended to reach acts of manufacturing or distribution
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”350 The
defendant argued that this language deliberately excluded extraterritorial
application of a provision outlawing possession with intent to distribute.351
Though finding this argument “not wholly without force,” the court nonetheless
concluded that the possession-with-intent provision had extraterritorial effect
based on the “statutory scheme,” “context of the statute,” and “authoritative
legislative history.”352 Indeed, the court found these arguments sufficient not
only to overcome the text of the venue provision but also the presumption
against extraterritoriality.353
In an additional case with “less than pellucid” language, the Third Circuit
used context to decide that a provision of the bankruptcy code did not permit
the trustee to aggregate small, prepetition payments to different creditors so that
they would fall above a $5,850 threshold and consequently be “avoidable,” that
is, recoverable by the trustee.354 While the statute provides that the “aggregate
value” of transfers to “a creditor” could be considered, and while a bankruptcy
rule of interpretation provides that “the singular includes the plural,” the court
rejected the Trustee’s reading of these provisions as allowing the aggregation
of transfers to multiple creditors, claiming that such an aggregation would
“make[] little sense” in view of the “statutory scheme.”355 Rather than relying
on a narrow textualist reading of these provisions, the court considered instead
347. 832 F.3d at 160.
348. Id. at 161.
349. Id. at 162–63 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015)); Hernandez, 829 F.3d
at 1072 (language is “ambiguous when read in isolation,” but its meaning was made clear by “context”
and “the statute’s remedial purpose”).
350. Epskamp, 832 F.3d at 161 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 959(c)).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 162–66.
353. Id. at 164.
354. In re Net Pay Sols., Inc., 822 F.3d 144, 149–50 (3d Cir. 2016) (text is “less than pellucid”
but meaning clear when “read in context”).
355. Id. at 149–51 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(c)(9), 102(7)).
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that the purpose of the provision is to “discourage litigation over relatively
insignificant transfer amounts.”356 While the text is at best indeterminate,
purpose and scheme allowed the court to reach a sensible interpretation of the
statute.
The Third Circuit reached a similar result in a case considering the meaning
of the term “facility” in the Stored Communications Act.357 The court
considered whether a personal computer could be considered a “facility” such
that defendant Google violated the act by placing tracking cookies on plaintiffs’
web browsers.358 While conceding that the semantic meaning of “facility” is
broad enough to encompass a personal computer, the court said that such a
reading would undermine statutory plan, and looked to “textual
clues . . . legislative history and enactment context” to conclude that “facility”
is a “term of art” which excludes personal computers from coverage under the
statute.359
Finally, the court in Hernandez v. Williams used context and purpose to
construe an indeterminate provision of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA).360 The provision requires that a debt collector take certain action
following “the initial communication” with a debtor; the question in the case is
whether the action needed only be taken by the initial debt collector or whether
each and every subsequent collector also needs to take the action.361 The court
held that the statute applies to each and every collector who attempts to collect
the debt; the court found the text ambiguous and based its conclusion on the
structure of the FDCPA, its purposes, and a brief foray in to the legislative
history of the provision.362

356. Id. at 151 (citing In re Bay Area Glass, Inc., 454 B.R. 86, 90 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011)).
357. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement & Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 145–48 (3d
Cir. 2015) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2701).
358. Id. at 132–33, 145–46.
359. Id. at 147.
360. 829 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)).
361. Id.
362. Id. at 1073–80. The court noted that resort to legislative history was “unnecessary,” but
found its conclusion reinforced by that source. Id. at 1079–80. For an additional case in this genre,
see Alamo v. United States, 850 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017), which affirms the method the Army
used to calculate overtime pay for EMTs. The court found that any ambiguity or lack of clarity in the
applicable regulations was resolved by “contextual analysis” of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at
1352–53 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015)).
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In several cases, courts turn to context and scheme to reach different
readings than have already been reached by different circuits.363 For example,
the Second Circuit in an ERISA case found that the phrase “normal retirement
age” could not refer to a period of five years of service for employees of an
accounting firm.364 The court had no problem defining “normal retirement age”
as a period of years of service, and the court recognized that the term “confers
considerable discretion on retirement plan creators to determine normal
retirement age.”365 However, in view of the statutory scheme, it found that so
short a time period was not a “normal” retirement age, directly contrary to a
Seventh Circuit decision which approved a five-year period as the “normal
retirement age” in an ERISA plan.366 The textual conflicts in this case are not
so sharp; nonetheless, the case provides an example of a court choosing a
reading it believes to be faithful to the statute’s purpose in the face of a contrary
reading by a different federal court of appeals.367
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held that the meaning of an attorney fee
provision in a class action lawsuit involving coupon settlements becomes
“clearer” when considered in context, and the Ninth Circuit’s contrary
interpretation of that provision becomes “less persuasive.”368 The provision in
question set a requirement that attorney fees in coupon-settlement class actions
must be based on a percentage of coupons actually redeemed, not the entire
number of coupons made available.369 A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit
held that this provision foreclosed the lodestar method of calculating attorney
fees in coupon-settlement class action cases.370 The Seventh Circuit disagreed
and viewed this provision as defining how to calculate attorney fees when they
are based on coupon settlements, but looking to neighboring subsections to

363. Laurent v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 794 F.3d 272, 280, 283 (2d Cir. 2015) (a reading
in context and with a view towards place in statutory scheme results in circuit split); In re Southwest
Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 708–09 (7th Cir. 2015) (meaning of statute becomes “clearer”
when considered in context, and the “Ninth Circuit’s reading becomes less persuasive”).
364. Laurent, 794 F.3d at 273.
365. Id. at 280–81.
366. Id. at 281–85.
367. See generally id.
368. In re Southwest Airlines, 799 F.3d at 708–10.
369. Id. at 707 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2012)). The statute envisions a more complex
arrangement where the settlement includes coupons and other relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(b)–(c).
370. In re Southwest Airlines, 799 F.3d at 706 (citing In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d
1173, 1183–85 (9th Cir. 2013)).
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govern lodestar and mixed settlements.371 Again, in a case where the language
seemed susceptible to multiple readings, the court followed its view of what the
statutory scheme required, even in the face of a contrary holding from a
different circuit.372
C. Cases that Reject a Purposive Reading of Text
Some nine cases plus two separate opinions reject plan and purpose
arguments in statutory construction cases.373 The concerns of these courts,
while overlapping, fall into two basic categories. First, these courts find
purpose to be an imprecise interpretive guide and prefer text and linguistic
371. Id. at 710.
372. In three cases in the set, judges writing separately accuse the majority of adopting a narrow
textualist reading that is both incorrect and that does not pay sufficient attention to the context,
structure, and purpose of the statute as a whole. See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited,
Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492, 537–40 (2d Cir. 2017) (Chin, J., dissenting) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory
Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014)) (arguing that “[w]hen the Act is read as a whole, it is clear
that Congress did not intend the phrase ‘navigable waters’ to be interpreted as a single water body
because that interpretation is ‘inconsisten[t] with the design and structure of the statute as a whole’”);
Jabateh v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 332, 344 (7th Cir. 2017) (Hamilton, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (arguing that “sporadic and largely unpaid help” with translation at medical
appointments could not constitute “material support” for terrorism because that reading “loses sight”
of “broader statutory context and purpose”); Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1054–59
(9th Cir. 2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that various uses of the statutory terms in different
places in the Immigration and Naturalization Act leads to the conclusion that “a diagnosis of the disease
of alcoholism does not, as a matter of immigration, mean that a petitioner lacks good moral character
as a ‘habitual drunkard’”).
Finally, in Sijapati v. Boente, the Fourth Circuit embraced purpose to guide the meaning of
ambiguous text in the course of deferring to an agency interpretation under Chevron. In this case, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the Board of Immigration Appeals’ construction of a statute that governs the
removability of a person who is not a citizen (in the terms of the INA, an “alien”) convicted of a crime
of moral turpitude. 848 F.3d 210, 213 (4th Cir. 2017) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)). The
statute provides that such a person is removable if convicted of a crime of moral turpitude within five
years of “the date of admission.” Id. In this case, the defendant Sijapati was initially admitted to the
United States in 2001, reentered the country in 2003, and was convicted of a crime of moral turpitude
in 2007. Id. at 213–14. Sijapati argued that the term “the date of admission” contemplates only a
single date of admission (because of its use of the definite article “the”) and that this date referred only
to the date of initial admission (2001), not to the date of readmission after travel abroad (2003). Id. at
216. The court found the language ambiguous and deferred to BIA’s conclusion that while “the date
of admission” indeed referred only to one date, the date it referred to which the admission most
proximate in time to an alien’s criminal conviction. Id. at 216–17. This deference was due, said the
court, because BIA “tethered its interpretation to traditional tools of statutory interpretation,” including
language, statutory context, statutory scheme, and purpose. Id. at 217–18.
373. See infra Sections IV.C.1–2.
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canons to ground interpretation.374 Second, these courts assert that contextual
and purposive interpretation treads too close to the legislative function.375
1. Cases Where Purpose Arguments Do Not Overcome Text and Context
In Michigan Flyer, LLC v. Wayne County Airport Authority, the Sixth
Circuit considered a provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
that forbids retaliation against “individuals” who have complained about an
ADA violation.376 The plaintiffs in the case were transportation companies
involved in a dispute with the local airport authority that included claims the
airport authority violated the ADA.377 The court affirmed dismissal of the
complaint, holding that the meaning of the term “individual,” which is not
defined in the ADA, “is unambiguous and does not include corporations.”378
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the “remedial scheme of the
ADA” requires a broad interpretation which would allow corporations to bring
suit, thus rejecting the plaintiffs’ reliance on King v. Burwell on the grounds
that purpose cannot be used to overcome plain, unambiguous statutory
meaning.379
Interestingly, the Michigan Flyer court affirmed the trial court’s
discretionary decision not to award attorney fees because the case involved “a
matter of first impression” that clarified law “not known to the Plaintiffs” at the
beginning of the suit.380 While the language of the statute may have been
“unambiguous,” it was apparently not so clear that the plaintiffs should have
known it from the very beginning of the suit.381
A perhaps more candid account of the court’s treatment of language can be
found in Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.382 In that case, the Ninth
Circuit rejected a claim under CERCLA (the so-called Superfund statute) that
a smelter located ten miles north of the Canadian border “deposit[ed]”
pollutants (and therefore arranged for their “disposal”) when it emitted them

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

See infra Section IV.C.1.
See infra Section IV.C.2.
860 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir. 2017) (examining 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)).
Id. at 427.
Id. at 427–28, 431.
Id. at 429 n.1.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 427–28, 431.
See 830 F.3d 975, 980–86 (9th Cir. 2016).
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through a smoke stack.383 The court recognized the flexibility of the language
involved, calling plaintiffs’ broad reading of the terms of the statute “reasonable
enough,” but it found itself bound by past precedents (including an en banc
decision) to a narrower interpretation.384 In reaching this finding, the court
rejected plaintiffs’ invocation of CERCLA’s “broad remedial purpose” because
the purpose argument at its highest level would result in a reading not grounded
in text, structure, and past precedent.385
The Seventh Circuit has similarly affirmed that “vague notions of a statute’s
‘basic purpose’ are inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the
specific issue under consideration.”386 The court held that an ERISA provision
authorizing suits for “appropriate equitable relief” does not permit a suit against
other insurers involving a coordination of benefits dispute because the relief
sought is legal, not equitable.387 The court rejected the ERISA-trusteeplaintiff’s high-level purpose argument that allowing his suit would be
“consistent with ERISA’s underlying purposes of protecting plan assets and
enforcing plan terms.”388
In B.D. v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit considered whether a
provision of IDEA that allowed a cause of action to “any party aggrieved by
the findings and decision of a hearing officer” allowed a prevailing party to
bring a suit for enforcement of a hearing officer’s favorable decisions.389 In
holding that enforcement suits were not authorized by this provision, the D.C.
Circuit reached an opposite conclusion to the First and Third Circuits, which
relied on “purpose arguments” to find such suits authorized.390 The D.C.
Circuit, however, found both that the text and the statutory context as found in
the “most related provision” reinforced the “plain meaning,” and thus refused
to rely on purpose to reach a different result.391
Wholesale rejection of purpose, even where it merely reinforces the
apparent meaning of text, is highly unusual; indeed, only one case that does this
can be found in the set under examination, and even then only two judges
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Id. at 978 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)).
Id. at 983.
Id. at 985.
Cent. States v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 840 F.3d 448, 454 (7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
Id. at 449.
Id. at 454 (citations omitted).
817 F.3d 792, 800 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (considering 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)).
Id. at 801.
Id. at 802.
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subscribe to so staunchly an anti-purpose view.392 In In re Schwartz-Tallard,
the en banc Ninth Circuit found that a provision of the Bankruptcy Code
permitting the debtor to recover “actual damages, including costs and attorneys’
fees” permitted recovery of attorney fees both to remedy a violation of the
automatic stay as well as fees in the subsequent damages action against the
violator.393 The majority found the provision unambiguous, and it cited King
for the idea that its language-based holding was also supported by the statute’s
“plan.”394 In concurrence, Judge Bea, joined by Judge O’Scannlain, asserts that
the unambiguous meaning of the statute “should be the beginning and end of
our analysis,” and proclaims himself “troubled” that the majority “proceeds to
speculate” about Congress’s plan.395 Judge Bea regards that discussion as
“unnecessary” and a violation of “judicial restraint.”396
From these cases, one can conclude that highest-level purpose arguments
are suspect, and that these courts are most receptive to structure and scheme
arguments where they reinforce a linguistically plausible reading of the text. A
small number of judges apply textualist principles in such a way as to reject
purposive arguments, but these judges hew to an outlier position.397
2. Cases in Which Courts Reject Purposive Readings for Institutional Reasons
In setting forth interpretive principles, the Fifth Circuit in In re Settoon
Towing, LLC pointed to “plain statutory language” as the “most instructive and
reliable indicator of Congressional intent,” and stated that judicial power is
“constrained by our mandate to respect the role of the Legislature, and take care
not to undo what it has done.”398 The decision in the case follows the text of

392. In re Schwartz-Tallard, 803 F.3d 1095, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2015) (Bea, J., concurring).
393. Id. at 1097 (interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)).
394. Id. at 1100.
395. Id. at 1101 (Bea, J., concurring).
396. Id. (Bea, J., concurring).
397. See Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1048–50 (9th Cir. 2017); Berman v.
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 146–55 (2d Cir. 2015).
398. 859 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting King v. Burwell, 135 U.S. 2480, 2496 (2015))
(internal quotation omitted). The dissenting judge in Stiltner v. Hart, cited the same language objecting
to the panel majority’s holding that a mentally incompetent defendant was entitled to equitable tolling
of the one-year statute of limitations found in the habeas corpus statute. 657 Fed. Appx. 513, 527 (6th
Cir. 2016). The judge declared that “[w]e do not have the power to carve a blanket exception into
AEDPA that does not exist, yet that is exactly what the majority does.” Id at 528. The answer in this
case is not as clear as one may imagine; the courts have a long history of applying equitable doctrines
to statutes that do not contain express provisions of same. See Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383–
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the statute at issue; the court cites legislative history to support its read of the
text, but only after an extensive textual discussion.399 However, the Court’s
invocation of King language relating to judicial power raises an institutional
concern that purpose not be used to create law not found in the statutory text.
This point is made clearly in several cases that cite King.400
Judge O’Scannlain is even clearer on this point in a concurrence to the
Ninth Circuit unpublished decision in Compton v. Dyncorp Int’l, Inc.401 Facing
a situation where an earlier statute lodged jurisdiction for an administrative
appeal in the district court but a later amendment to a companion statute appears
to lodge jurisdiction in the court of appeals, the Ninth Circuit held in 1979 that
the later statute governed, speculating that Congress’ failure to amend the
earlier statute must have been “inadvertent.”402 Judge O’Scannlain noted that
five subsequent courts of appeals have rejected this reasoning, and that the
earlier statute contains language suggesting it should control where the two
statues differ.403 Based upon these observations, Judge O’Scannlain urged that
the 1979 decision be overruled, arguing that departing from what he considered
to be the plain text of the earlier provision “aggrandizes judicial power and
encourages congressional lassitude,” borrowing the phrase from Justice
Scalia’s dissent in King.404 Put differently, the courts should not attempt to
update a statute in light of later amendments to a cognate provision.405 Instead,
the courts should enforce the result of the statute as written and leave to
Congress to fix any results it doesn’t like.

84 (2012) (recognizing that common law qualified immunity is available to defendants sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 even though the statutory text does not explicitly provide for this defense; qualified
immunity is a “common law protections well-grounded in history and reason” that has “not been
abrogated” by the general language of the statute).
399. In re Settoon Towing, L.L.C., 859 F.3d 340, 352 (5th Cir. 2017). Arguably, the citation to
legislative history suggests that this case belongs in Section IV.D below. However, I resist putting it
there because the court employs clear textualist techniques and only deploys legislative history to
confirm its read on one particular point.
400. For an example, see In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d
125, 147 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496).
401. See generally 650 Fed. Appx. 550, 553–55 (9th Cir. 2016) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring).
402. Id. at 554–55 (describing Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 603 F.2d
763, 770 (9th Cir. 1979)).
403. Id.
404. Id. at 555 (quoting King, 135 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
405. Id.
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In Chu v. United States Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, the Ninth
Circuit followed closely the language of a statute, even when an amendment
appeared not to make sense.406 Congress in the Dodd-Frank law inexplicably
removed a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of review for decisions of
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.407 As a result, the court held,
it would not read that standard back into the statute, but instead applied the
lesser “substantial evidence” standard from the Administrative Procedure
Act.408 The court commented that this was not a “patently obvious . . . drafting
mistake” that it could correct, and declared that it was “beyond our province to
rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we think . . . is
the preferred result.”409
D. Cases Where Purpose and Text Do Not Conflict
In twenty-two cases in the set, the opinions do not recognize a conflict
between purpose and text. Indeed, in most of these cases, there is no significant
conflict in this area. What a careful reader can glean from these cases is the
methods used by the court in reaching decisions. The cases fall rather easily
into broad categories, and analysis of the specific case facts and rules adds little
to the present discussion. Consequently, the discussion below will outline the
various approaches taken by the courts and will cite cases illustrating those
approaches in the footnotes.
The formulation of priority in King reads as follows:
If the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according
to its terms. But oftentimes the “meaning—or ambiguity—of
certain words or phrases may only become evident when
placed in context.” So when deciding whether the language is
plain, we must read the words “in their context and with a view
to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Our duty, after
all, is “to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.”410
406. 823 F.3d 1245, 1250 (9th Cir. 2016).
407. Id. at 1249.
408. Id. at 1250.
409. Id. (citations omitted). Apparently, the court views “drafting errors” differently from
“drafting mistakes.” While there may be some ability to correct the latter, correcting the former raises
institutional concerns for this panel.
410. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal citations omitted) (first citing Hardt
v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010); then citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson,
529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000); and then citing Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U. S. 280, 290 (2010)).
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Thirteen cases cite the second, third, or fourth sentences of this paragraph
as a lead in to discussions that analyze plain language followed by context and
statutory scheme, where context and scheme are used to reinforce the court’s
view of the language.411 Five additional cases rely on this language and then

411. See United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 848 F.3d 330, 338–39 (4th
Cir. 2017) (holding that the Attorney General has “an absolute veto power over voluntary settlements
in qui tam [False Claims Act] suits” by relying on plain language, context, and statutory scheme);
Rainero v. Archon Corp., 844 F.3d 832, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that federal courts lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over certain state law securities class action claims based upon plain
language and statutory scheme the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act); Nat’l Biodiesel Bd.
v. EPA, 843 F.3d 1010, 1018–20 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting challenge to EPA application of record
keeping requirements under the Renewable Fuel Standards program based on regulatory context and
scheme); Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. W. Heritage Ins. Co., 832 F.3d 1229, 1236–38 (11th Cir. 2016)
(holding that the Medicare Act repayment provisions permit a Medicare Advantage Organization to
sue a primary payer in the same manner as the government could; relying on language confirmed by
context and scheme); Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 689 n.41 (7th Cir. 2016)
(holding that the Department of Energy issued regulations properly, using the text of the provision at
issue as a basis for understanding the statutory plan); Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d
1320, 1322–23, 1327 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 does not conflict with the Federal Arbitration Provision, based on
plain language of the statute, context, and canons); In re Wright, 826 F.3d 774, 778–83 (4th Cir. 2016)
(holding that a state prisoner challenging the “execution” of his sentence is required to file under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 and may not invoke § 2241 based upon “the plain language of the statutes at issue and
the purpose and context of AEDPA”); Assocs. Against Outlier Fraud v. Huron Consulting Grp., Inc.,
817 F.3d 433, 436–37 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that term “expenses” under the fee-shifting provisions
of the False Claims Act does not include “costs” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), and
the terms have different meanings based upon contextual provisions in the FCA and the manner in
which the FCA and the Federal Rules Civil Procedure use the two terms); Cypress v. United States,
646 Fed. Appx. 748, 752–54 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that “[t]ribe” as used in the Miccosukee
Reserved Area Act refers to the Native American tribe itself and not individual members of the tribe
based upon statutory context and scheme); Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48,
52–57 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that Medicare Act does not provide recourse to an Article III court
when Administrative Law Judge fails to issue a timely decision on a reimbursement claim, relying on
statutory context and scheme of the Medicare administrative adjudication system); Greater Missouri
Med. Pro-Care Providers, Inc. v. Perez, 812 F.3d 1132, 1137–41 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that the
Secretary of Labor is not authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act to broaden the scope of
an “aggrieved party” investigation to include other employees beyond the complainant based upon
statutory language, purpose, and scheme); United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1270–71 (11th Cir.
2015) (concluding that the federal criminal embezzlement statute is “consistent and coherent” after
“considering the overall statutory scheme”); DiBacco v. U.S. Army, 795 F.3d 178, 196–99 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (holding that the CIA director is permitted to exercise discretion conferred on the Director of
National Intelligence by the National Security Act for purposes of withholding materials from
disclosure under Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act; considering the context of the
National Security Act regulatory scheme).
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use context, scheme, and legislative history to support their interpretations of
statutory language.412 Finally, in at least two cases, the “context” at issue
includes entirely different statutes and/or principles of the common law or of
federalism.413
V. THE SUPREME COURT REFUSES TO REVISIT KING V. BURWELL, OR DOES
IT ?
As one might expect, the Supreme Court has weighed in on a very small
number of decisions that cite King. Only two cases provide the Court an

Two cases involve more straightforward application of statutory text with little interpretation;
here too the courts state that context and scheme are important in understanding how the provisions
apply. See BWP Media USA, Inc. v. Clarity Dig. Grp., LLC, 820 F.3d 1175, 1179–81 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Digital Millennium Copyright Act); I.R. ex rel. E.N. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d
1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2015) (IDEA).
412. SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the CEO or CFO of
an issuer may be liable under Sarbanes-Oxley § 304 when the issuer needs to prepare an accounting
restatement due to misconduct even if the CEO or CFO is not personally responsible for the
misconduct; textual reading supported by legislative history); City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. U.S.
Dep’t of Transp., 796 F.3d 993, 998–1001 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the city and county of San
Francisco has no right of action for mandamus under the federal Pipeline Safety Act to force the
Department of Transportation to regulate a natural gas transmission pipeline in a particular way;
holding based on the “plain statutory language, the statutory structure, the legislative history, the
structure of similar federal statutes, and interpretations of similar statutory provisions by the Supreme
Court and our sister circuits”); Mechammil v. City of San Jacinto, 653 Fed. Appx. 562, 563–65 (9th
Cir. 2016) (holding that local governments in California may not impose a special assessment or attach
a lien to real property to collect fines or penalties for certain local ordinance violations; reading several
statutes together and consulting legislative history of California statutes); In re Certified Question of
Law, 858 F.3d 591, 595–604 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2016) (holding that relevant provisions of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act permit capture of certain information in connection with a FISA warrant
after considering statutory context and legislative history); ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 810
F.3d 1283, 1289–99 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the term “articles” in the Tariff Act of 1930 is
unambiguous and does not include “electronic transmissions of digital data” in view of statutory
context and legislative history).
413. See Ojo v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 533, 538–41 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding facially valid state court
nunc pro tunc adoption orders merit deference in matters under provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act that apply to children “adopted while under sixteen years of age”; interpreting the INA
provision at issue in light of its own statutory context, state family law principles and principles of
federalism); Rai v. WB Imico Lexington Fee, LLC, 802 F.3d 353, 358–64 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that
notice to an attorney is sufficient under provisions of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act
even where not explicitly provided by the statute in light of agency law principles).
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opportunity to weigh in with meaningful guidance, and in both cases, it declines
to do so.414
In Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, the Supreme Court settled a circuit
split over the reach of Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protections for
whistleblowers.415 Dodd-Frank defines a whistleblower as an individual who
“provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission.”416 However, one subsection of the
anti-retaliation provision protects individuals who “mak[e] disclosures that are
required or protected [inter alia] under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”417
Sarbanes-Oxley does not require disclosure to be made to SEC; under SarbanesOxley, whistleblower protection is extended to all “employees” who report
misconduct to the government or merely to an internal supervisor.418 The
question matters because Dodd-Frank provides more generous remedies to
whistleblowers than Sarbanes-Oxley.419 Thus, the question that divided the
lower courts: Does the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions (and their
associated more generous remedies) apply to employees who make internal
disclosures of misconduct but do not report that misconduct to the SEC?420
The lower courts diverged on this question. The Fifth Circuit held that the
answer was “no,” that Dodd-Frank protections only apply to individuals who
report information to the SEC and fit within the Dodd-Frank definition of
“whistleblower.”421 Divided panels of the Second and Ninth Circuits reached

414. See generally Dig. Realty Tr. Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018); Mount Lemmon Fire
Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22 (2018).
415. 138 S. Ct. at 772, 776.
416. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
417. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
418. Somers, 138 S. Ct. at 772 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)).
419. See id. at 778.
420. See generally Somers v. Dig, Reality Tr. Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017); Berman v.
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015); Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620
(5th Cir. 2013).
421. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630. This opinion, of course, does not cite King v. Burwell as it was
issued before King was decided.
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the opposite conclusion.422 Both the majority opinions and the dissents in the
Second and Ninth Circuits feature prominent discussions of King.423
The majority in the Second and Ninth Circuits follow the same essential
analytical path. Both opinions did not find a clear textual solution.424 Both
majority opinions also rely on a Scalia-Garner observation that statutory
definitions “are, after all, just one indication of meaning—a very strong
indication, to be sure, but nonetheless one that can be contradicted by other
indications.”425
Having found room for interpretation, both courts conclude that applying
the narrower Dodd-Frank definition of “whistleblower” would undermine the
regulatory purposes of the statute, spending a considerable amount of space
exploring the pragmatic, real-world consequences of the narrower definition.426
The Second Circuit decision in Berman is interesting because it explicitly
wraps itself in the mantle of King. At the beginning of the opinion, the Second
Circuit majority says that the case contains a “similar issue” to King, though it
later contends that the issue in King was “far more problematic” because the
Supreme Court in King had to decide whether a “phrase means something other
than what it literally says,” while the court in Berman need only decide how to
reconcile a definitional provision that appears to conflict with a substantive
provision.427 Perhaps even more strikingly, Berman cites Church of the Holy
Trinity as a case in which the Court refused to apply the express terms of a
statute because they yielded a result “unlikely to have been intended by
Congress.”428 The Ninth Circuit’s citation of King in Somers is more discreet;
the court relies on King for the less-controversial idea that “terms can have
different operative consequences in different contexts.”429
422. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1050 (concluding that the statute extends protections to individuals
who report internally and concluding that SEC regulations taking the same position are entitled to
deference); Berman, 801 F.3d at 146 (finding the statute ambiguous and extending Chevron deference
to SEC regulation).
423. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049; id. at 1051 (Owens, J., dissenting); Berman, 801 F.3d at 146,
150, 155; id. at 155–56, 159–60 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
424. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049–50 (Dodd-Frank’s definitional provision “should not be
dispositive”); Berman, 801 F.3d at 155 (finding the Dodd-Frank language ambiguous).
425. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049 (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 228); Berman, 801
F.3d at 154 (quoting the same language).
426. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049–50; Berman, 801 F.3d at 151–52.
427. Berman, 801 F.3d. at 146, 150.
428. Id. at 150.
429. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049.
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The dissents in the Second and Ninth circuit cases contest any number of
points, but they are most interesting for their explicit rejections of King.430 In
his very first sentence, Judge Jacobs in Berman accuses the majority of
“alter[ing] a federal statute by deleting three words (‘to the Commission’) from
the definition of ‘whistleblower’ in the Dodd-Frank Act.”431 He accuses the
majority of relying “almost wholly” on King and contends that the case should
not be understood as a “not a wholesale revision of the Supreme Court’s
statutory interpretation jurisprudence, which for decades past has consistently
honored plain text over opportunistic inferences about legislative history and
purpose.”432 Judge Jacobs argues that the Supreme Court decided King as it did
to avert disaster, and the present case would hardly result in disaster if the
language of the whistleblower definition was held to be controlling.433 In
Somers, Judge Owen’s dissent minces even fewer words: “In my view, we
should quarantine King and its potentially dangerous shapeshifting nature to
the specific facts of that case to avoid jurisprudential disruption on a cellular
level. Cf. John Carpenter’s The Thing (Universal Pictures 1982).”434
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, reversed the
judgment of the Ninth Circuit and held, based on the definition provision, that
Dodd-Frank protections and remedies only apply to “whistleblowers” who
report misconduct to the SEC.435 The Court’s decision rests on textual
justifications, beginning by admonishing that explicit statutory definitions must
be followed.436 The Court reinforces its textual reasoning with what it perceives
to be the purpose of Dodd-Frank: to motivate individuals with knowledge of
securities violations to report them to the Securities and Exchange
Commission.437 The Court then considers various consequences for the
regulatory scheme raised by the Somers and by the Solicitor General,
concluding that the regulatory scheme is not destroyed if Dodd-Frank

430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Id. at 1051 (Owens, J., dissenting); Berman, 801 F.3d at 159 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
Berman, 801 F.3d 155 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
Id. at 159 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
Id.
Somers, 850 F.3d at 1051 (Owens, J., dissenting).
Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 772–73 (2018).
Id. at 776–77.
Id. at 777–78.
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protection is limited to whistleblowers who make reports to the SEC as well as
to internal corporate sources.438
Notably, the Court does not cite King v. Burwell, even where it could,
declining to become involved in the dispute about its jurisprudential reach.439
The Court’s decision is rooted in text, informed by purpose, and considers the
consequential arguments of the parties.440 Concurring opinions debate the
relevance of the single available piece of relevant legislative history, but
ultimately only three justices (Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch) would reject that
source of meaning.441 Thus, the Court does not commit the lower courts to a
narrow form of textualism.
The Supreme Court made similar move in another 2018 opinion by Justice
Ginsburg, this time for an 8-0 majority.442 The Court reviewed the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Guido v. Mount Lemon Fire District.443 In Guido, a Ninth
Circuit panel decision authored by Judge O’Scannlain creates a split with the
sixth, seventh, eighth and tenth circuits by holding that the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act’s twenty-employee minimum does not apply to state and
local government employers.444 The Ninth Circuit relied on a plain-language
reading of the text: in a two-pronged statutory provision defining a term
“employer” for purposes of the Act, the twenty-employee minimum clearly
applies to a “person in an industry affecting commerce,” but does not appear in
438. Id. at 778–82. An analysis of these consequentialist arguments is beyond the scope of the
current discussion as it is not necessary to understand the Court’s statutory construction moves.
439. See generally id.
440. Id. at 776–82.
441. Id. at 782 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 783–84 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgement). The Supreme Court has reversed two additional cases that cite King.
Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 817 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, Advocate Health
Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality
Baby Prods., LLC, 807 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017). Both cases
cite King for unremarkable propositions, and neither addresses conflicts between purpose and text.
Stapleton, 817 F.3d at 526 (“Our duty, after all, is to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.”); SCA
Hygiene, 807 F.3d at 1336 (Hughes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part ) (“It is a fundamental
canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view
to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”). In both cases, as to the statutory interpretation issues,
the Supreme Court appears to simply disagree on the meaning of less-than-clear statutory text.
Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. at 1658–62; SCA Hygiene, 137 S. Ct. at 962–63. Neither case has clear signaling
value on the question of how courts should reconcile text and purpose.
442. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22 (2018).
443. 859 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1165 (2018).
444. Id. at 1172–74.
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a second sentence which provides that the term employer “also means” a state
or local government.445 The Ninth Circuit cited King for the notion that its
reading “certainly does not threaten to destroy the entire statutory scheme.”446
The court rejected purposive and legislative-history based arguments that
counseled a contrary result.447
The Supreme Court, per Justice Ginsburg, affirmed the Ninth Circuit,
relying heavily on textualist reasoning, but also taking a broad look at how
similar remedial civil rights statutes treat the same issue.448 Again, the Court
does not cite King for any reason. The Court does compare the ADEA to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and to the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA).449 Title VII imposes a textually-clear numerosity requirement on
public employers; FLSA is equally clear, according to the Court, that it applies
to all governmental employers regardless of their size.450 The Court is not
troubled that its decision renders the reach of the ADEA broader than Title VII
because “this disparity is a consequence of the different language Congress
chose to employ,” and because the FLSA, which served as a model for the
ADEA is a “better comparator.”451 The Court’s decision, while textual, is also
deeply intertextual.
VI. CONCLUSION
The text-vs.-purpose debate in statutory interpretation has been called
“boring” by a very prominent academic and judge.452 And indeed in its simplest
form, it is. However, the real day-to-day work of courts is considerably more
complex than caricatures of Holy Trinity or “[w]ords no longer have meaning”
would suggest.453 Understanding how courts use purpose and what evidence
supports that use involves a close look at what courts actually do. This paper
attempts to begin that process by looking at a discrete set of cases likely to
provide strong evidence of the use of purpose. While further investigation is
necessary to assess the impact of Donald Trump’s appointments to the
judiciary, it seems clear at the present moment that the use of purpose is alive
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1174 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015)).
Id. at 1174–75.
Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 25–27 (2018).
Id. at 25–26.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Gluck & Posner, supra note 16, at 1300.
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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and well in statutory interpretation and is likely to remain so. Further, the
judicial role at the court of appeals level has not eroded into ideological battles
or, worse yet, sloganeering. Instead, in the vast majority of cases studied here,
the courts behave as courts, using all the tools available, to greater or lesser
degrees, to give statutes their fullest and best meaning.

